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SELECTED GRADUATE STUDENT PAPERS IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION

Gene D. Phillips

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Gene D. Phillips, who has edited the student papers in this issue, has been on the faculties of the School of Education, the Philosophy Department of the College of Liberal Arts and the Graduate School of Boston University for the past four years. Presently he is chairman of the department of educational foundations.

He maintains that the selected papers reflect key concepts which today affect the conduct of schooling in the broadest sense possible: science as a resource for directing social progress, analysis of a productive personality in a cultural setting, value commitments of the teacher, creativity, the "sociology of knowledge," and religion and education in comparative perspective.

Another way of looking at the articles might be that each contains a method which is attempting to criticize continuously its own presuppositions. Each one is further seeking to analyze the foundational ideas upon which various educational techniques have been knowingly or unknowingly structured.

The largest of intents here, however, is to provide students questing after improved insights into the theoretical study of education, a medium of expression.

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Selected Graduate Student Papers in the Foundations of Education

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Gene D. Phillips

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SELECTED GRADUATE STUDENT PAPERS IN THE FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION

Introduction

The articles to follow represent a variety of topics in the foundations of education. They are in no way to be considered as parts of a continuum, rather they reflect the current interests of selected graduate students in a given department of the School of Education, Boston University.

Editing of the manuscripts has not gone beyond that of the professor's comments for revision in whose class the paper was written and where minor deletions have been made necessary because of space limitations in final publication.

Some explicit reasons might be offered for including certain papers above others: 1. An attempt was made to select a paper from each of the foundational areas: philosophical, historical, social, psychological, comparative and aesthetic; 2. Uniqueness of problem treatment was another consideration; 3. Uniqueness of subject-matter discovery was another; and 4. That the paper evidenced in its development the student's powers of growth of insight, discipline of guiding hypotheses, feeling for tentativeness in the quest of the problem's final solution was the final condition.

The first paper to appear has been written by Albert S. Kahn, "Science and the Study of Mind and Human Behavior." The study represents the kind of inter-disciplinary inquiry which is being encouraged in general in the Department. His penetrating analysis of the philosophy of science in relation to mind and human behavior is a case in point. It is philosophical, social, scientific, psychological, and cultural in scope. These multiple disciplines are given focus through probing into a problem — mind and method — which is of central concern to the profession of teaching today. It was written in a class on the Philosophy of Science whose professor was Dr. Marx Wartofsky, Department of Philosophy, College of Arts and Sciences.

The second paper to appear has been written by Mr. Charles S. Clayman. He has done a thoughtful condensation of a much longer paper, "Values and the Teacher." Here he indicates his deep and intimate knowledge of the anthropological understandings which are contributing much to the growth of research in professional education. The stimuli for the paper came from two classes, one in the Cultural Foundations of Education with Dr. Theodore Brameld and one in the Philosophy of Education with Dr. Gene D. Phillips.

The third paper has been included for its timely concern in relation to our past and present problem of church and state relations. Lawrence P. Creedon is the author of "Religion in the Schools of Great Britain." This indicates various cross-cultural concerns of a student pursuing comparative education as a major emphasis of study. This was written in a class in Introduction to Comparative Education under the guidance of Mr. Richard V. Rapacz.

The fourth paper to appear is an historical study, carefully researched, by Gerald Robbins. Its title is "Laura Towne: White Pioneer in Negro Edu-

cation, 1862-1901." Its reflections on negro education, post Civil-War, include rich allusions to problems of economic, political and social reconstruction as one human personality responded to them through the medium of education. This was completed under the direction of Dr. J. J. Chambliss in a class Historical Foundations of American Education.

The fifth paper is by Mrs. Marguerite R. Howie, "Karl Mannheim and the Sociology of Knowledge." The careful delineation of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge concept and the sharp contrast existing between the emphasis of Mannheim's and Popper's thinking make this for two reasons an extremely stimulating article. This was completed in a class in the Comparative Philosophies of Education under the guidance of Dr. Gene D. Phillips.

The last paper to appear is by Janet E. Forslund, "An Inquiry Into the Nature of Creative Teaching." Appropriately, this is stated in the first person; however, it represents an harmonious union of the affective and rational. This was completed in an in-service class in Current Issues in American Education Newton Public Schools, Newton, Massachusetts, under the direction of Dr. Theodore Brameld.

SCIENCE AND THE STUDY OF MIND AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR

by
ALBERT S. KAHN

INTRODUCTION

Preview of the problem — Modern philosophers, scientists, and philosophers of science are breaking through the barriers to scientific progress raised by the Cartesian mind-body dualism. Historically, the ancient Greeks established a philosophical dualism between the mind and the body which took the form of prizing theory over practice, philosophy over practical arts, leisure over work, and the rational mind over affective feelings. Concepts of modern science emphasizing observation of facts, hypothesis by induction, law, deduction, experiment, and confirmation, starting and ending with empirical facts, were almost unknown. Christian and medieval theology and scholasticism perpetuated the dualism. It was consistent with the institutional needs of the times.

With the beginnings of modern science in the Renaissance, Descartes' statement of the mind-body dualism provided the philosophical foundation for channeling the new scientific energies into the area of natural sciences leaving to the existing authorities continuing jurisdiction over problems of mind, human behavior, and ethics. Although scientists have been making tremendous progress in physics, chemistry, botany, biology, physical anthropology, physiology and related technological pursuits for some time, social psychology, psychology, ethics, political science, economics, and human relations have begun to receive attention from some scientists only recently. These investigators are frequently attacked by both non-scientists and natural scientists as being presumptuous in thinking that human behavior can be studied scientifically; it is argued that man's behavior is unpredictable, that science has nothing to do with values, that the problem is too complex, or whatever.

In some ways, not only has the natural scientist not encouraged scientific efforts to modify or change outmoded beliefs about mind and human behavior, but in fact has discouraged such efforts, and in effect, aligned himself with those forces in society opposed to scientific investigation of what they consider to be their special domain. Modern civilization finds itself faced by a culture-crisis. The best brains, employing the most rational method of investigation known to man, the scientific method, must be directed towards studying the mind, human nature, and human behavior to produce new insights and procedures in human relations. Beginnings have been made.

Statement of the problem — The problem has several aspects: (1) to show the pervasive effect of the mind-body dualism on the study of mind, human nature, and human behavior; (2) to indicate that the modern physicists' concept of reality, described by Whitehead as the "bifurcation of nature,"

is an outgrowth of the dualism and a continuing obstacle to empirical scientific study of mind, human nature, and behavior; (3) to show new efforts in philosophy and science to deal with these concerns.

Theoretical foundations for new directions — The following is a brief sketch of some of the theoretical foundations for the new undertakings in psychology, sociology, and social psychology among other human relations sciences.

1. Physics. In physics, Maxwell's field theory, Einstein's theory of relativity, Planck's statistical quantum theory, the Heisenberg principle of uncertainty, and the work of Bohr and Schroedinger are relaxing rigid notions of scientific respectability based on earlier theories of matter, measurement, prediction and certainty. The philosophical interpretation of the significance of these advances in the physical sciences reading with the macrocosm and the microcosm is being provided by men like Whitehead. What he calls the "bifurcation of nature" has characterized earlier scientific theories of the physical world around us. It

> ". . . has been disastrous both to science and to philosophy, but chiefly to philosophy. It has transformed the grand question of the relations between nature and mind into the petty form of the interaction between the human body and the human mind." [1]

To replace the scientific misapprehension of matter and the philosophical difficulty in epistemology Whitehead sketched:

> ". . . an alternative philosophy of science in which organism takes the place of matter. For this purpose, the mind involved in the materialist theory dissolves into a function of organism. The psychological field then exhibits what an event is in itself." [2]

Organism, function, event become central terms in the new studies of mind.

2. Philosophy. George Herbert Mead provides a philosophical underpinning for new directions in the study of human behavior by his focus on the social derivation of the mind as an emergent form. This he combines with an insistence on science as a research instrumentality to investigate *all* human problems. The implications of Mead's philosophy for a re-evaluation of the possible scope of science, not to mention a clearer awareness of its social responsibility, are central to the new inquiries into human nature, behavior and the mind. Their importance cannot be stressed too much in a discussion of the liberation of both natural science and philosophy from the mind-body strangle hold.

3. Logical analysis. Another source of support for the new ventures comes from logical analysts whose critical analysis of the meanings of statements helps remove layers of misunderstanding. Problems such as that of the mind-body dualism sometimes seem less forbidding after linguistic analysis. Feigl suggests a "referential identity of terms" to replace a "cowardly para-

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[1] Whitehead, A. N., *The Concept of Nature*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1920, p. 27.

[2] Whitehead, A. N., *Science and the Modern World*, New York: Mentor Books, p. 193.

lelism." [3] This does not result in a reductionism of either the mental to the physical or vice versa, but seeks rather to discuss them in a single linguistic system of referents.

4. Biology. Sinnott, the biologist, addresses himself to the mind-body problem. He develops the hypothesis that man's nature is characterized by goal-seeking, and

> "that development and behavior — leading to body and mind — are two aspects of the same basic process, one as real as the other, like the two sides of a coin. . . ." [4]

The implication for new possibilities in the study of human behavior becomes evident if the notion that man is goal-seeking becomes scientifically accepted.

5. Summary. Mead, Whitehead, Feigl, Sinnott have been chosen as examples of modern thinkers interested in the retarding effects of the historical mind-matter dualism on the scientific study of mind. Their roles have been played in this instance as philosophers of science. They have sought to examine some of the underlying presuppositions arising out of the Cartesian mind-body obfuscation. At the same time they have helped clarify notions of the function of science, enlarging its scope to include concerns, formerly, and still by many, considered to be beyond the pale. This increased comprehensiveness is of great importance for the future development of science and for its potential contribution to social progress.

2. Rationale

Academic dualism — Although the Cartesian dualism did not handicap the development of the natural sciences, it did preclude science from becoming more involved in a wider range of behavioral problems. It created dual jurisdictions for the material and the spiritual. Furthermore, the natural sciences tended to arrogate to themselves the exclusive trusteeship of science as a social activity. For many years academic prestige and status have been divided between the natural scientists and students of the liberal arts, each camp guarding its domain from foreign invasion, and at the same time demanding and getting between them practically all the academic resources available.

Limited view of science — The expansion of scientific activity into areas beyond the natural sciences and their technological applications have been stunted. As long as he was free to pursue his interest in physical science, the natural scientist abdicated to his non-scientific fellow academicians in the liberal arts the concern for problems of human behavior. The mathematical physicist has been criticized for his preoccupation with his theories of matter to a point of concern for its implications for everyday life; in order to be permitted to continue his speculations unmolested in his ivory-tower privacy, he is frequently found supporting intellectual positions needing re-evaluation and logically threatened by his findings. Spokesmen for science:

[3] Feigl, H., "The Mind-Body Problem in the Development of Logical Empiricism" in *Readings in the Philosophy of Science,* edited by Feigl, H., and Brodbeck, M., N.Y.: Appleton-Century, 1953.

[4] Sinnott, Edmund W., *The Biology of the Spirit,* New York: The Viking Press, 1955, p. viii.

". . . only remove the *foundation* of the common-sense world view; the *superstructure* is to remain and, so far as they are concerned, may be mistaken for reality by the uninformed. . . . Scientists are among the most conservative defenders of traditional religious symbols and practices. . . . You may believe anything else you please, providing you accept the world view of physical science as supreme"

This is a severe indictment of the representatives of modern physical science. Whitehead has pointed out their "bifurcation of nature" into the empirical world of everyday living and into the hypothetical world of electrons. Otto points out that this dualism leads the physical scientist to be concerned only with hypothetical reality. This kind of science abdicates responsibility for events in the common-sense world.

Cultural consequences — Dewey places the blame for many of the cultural ills of modern society on the way in which the mind-body problem affected the development of philosophy and science.

"I do not know of anything so disastrously affected by the tradition of separation and isolation as is this particular theme of body-mind. In its discussion are reflected the splitting off from each other of religion, morals, and science; the divorce of philosophy from science and of both from the arts of conduct. The evils which we suffer in education . . . in the materialism of business and the aloofness of 'intellectuals' from life, the whole separation of *knowledge and practice* — all testify to the necessity of seeing mind-body as an integral whole." [6]

In this connection, the current glorification in academic circles of "pure" science has gained considerable support at the expense of the practical arts. Honorific distinctions are made between theory and practice.

Pure science, dualism, and the quest for certainty — Historical precedence for such evaluations may be found in the honored pursuit of the trivium and the quadrivium in the days of Plato and Aristotle. The philosopher enjoyed unrivaled prestige and status. The social class differentiation and its corresponding distinction between the pure knowledge of truth, beauty, and justice and the applied arts necessary to the practical problems of human society found support in and at the same time provided nourishment for what Dewey calls the "quest for certainty." For, speculation concerning abstractions need never be put to the confirming tests demanded of practical pursuits. The material and the spiritual, body and mind, practice and theory, craftsman and academician offer differing degrees of intellectual and emotional security. Descartes expressed the seventeenth century version of this dichotomy. Its effect is still found today in many professional and most popular evaluations of the meaning of science even though philosophy and science have been exchanging positions during the last twenty-five hundred years.

Current notions identifying the scientific method with certainty of prediction, with exact experimental verification, with measurement, and with

[5] Otto, Max, *Science and the Moral Life*, New York: Mentor Books, 1949, p. 94.

[6] Dewey, John, *Philosophy and Civilization*, Minton, Balch, and Company, 1931, p. 301

athematical quantification may well be associated with the social and in-
llectual history of the "quest for certainty."

"the distinctive characteristic of practical activity . . . is the uncertainty which attends it. . . . Judgment and belief regarding actions to be performed can never attain more than a precarious probability. . . . The exaltation of pure intellect and its activity above practical affairs is fundamentally connected with the quest for a certainty which shall be absolute and unshakeable."

he criticisms leveled at the behavioral sciences and at the scientific study of uman relations rest on the notion that the highest degree of measurable cer-inty is to be found in the physical sciences. This kind and degree of certainty then identified with Science. Deduced from these premises is the proposition hat the study of human nature, behavior, and the mind, in their dynamic cial context, cannot provide this kind of certainty, is unscientific, and is herefore undeserving of a larger share of social resources. Arguments in upport of vested interests frequently invoke the fear of uncertainty in order o prevent experiment and change.

Whitehead, dualism, and science — Whitehead offers similar criticisms of odern science[8] and relates its theories to the Cartesian dualism. "The eneral conceptions introduced by science into modern thought cannot be eparated from the philosophical situation as expressed by Descartes"; White-ead is referring here to the "assumption of bodies and minds as independent dividual substances, each existing in its own right apart from any necessary eference to each other." In the nineteenth century this supported theories f private and personal worlds of morals. "The moral intuitions can be held apply only to the strictly private world of psychological experience." Such ncepts of morality are inadequate in the modern industrial world. The dvance of industrialization and urbanization has not been accompanied by corresponding concern for aesthetics: note the attendant disfiguration of ties. Also it has adversely affected the training of professionals. Compart-entalization of disciplines:

". . . produces minds in a groove . . . contemplating a given set of abstractions. . . . But there is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of human life. . . . The dangers arising from this aspect of professionalism are great, particularly in our democratic societies."[9]

his has particular significance for the organization of schools and universities to separate divisions, each operating independently of the other. Whitehead lso criticizes the preoccupation of modern science with the physical and the aterial at the expense of the aesthetic and moral. However, he expresses ighest confidence in the role to be played by science in the solution of prob-ms civilization must face in the future. This role will be expanded to clude studies of human behavior, the human mind, and human nature.

Dewey, John, "The Quest for Certainty" in *Intelligence in the Modern World,* Ratner, J., editor, New York: Random House, 1939, p. 278.

Whitehead, A. N., *Science and the Modern World,* op. cit., pp. 193-208.

Ibid., pp. 196-197.

Summary — Modern science has made tremendous strides in the study of matter and in the development of scientific method. Technological progress has proceeded at an amazing rate of speed. Control of the natural environment, material comforts, medical therapy, and automation, to mention some of its contributions, have brought conditions for living far beyond earlier human expectations. Hopes for the future are most optimistic. However, it has become quite apparent that the direction of activity taken by science and scientists has left important human problems in the hands of disciplines not always sympathetic to scientific methods of observation, inquiry, experimentation, and confirmation. Too often pre-existing truths derived from the authority of custom or some institutional source are uncritically accepted.

Aristotelian and medieval thinkers are criticized for seeking to confirm acceptable theories rather than to test and revise them when necessary. Modern scientists themselves might share some of this criticism. The premise of modern physical science, that order exists, and that the function of science is to develop laws explaining it, seems to result frequently in diverting the concerns of science from the kind of research that looks to developing new kinds of operating procedures in a changing cultural environment.

The integrating sciences concerned with human behavior seek to correct this situation; they seek to hurdle some of the obstacles left by the mind-body problem in the path of human progress. The successful resolution of this problem in this, the second half of the twentieth century, merits further attention.

3. Philosophy and Science: Some Theories of Mind.

Philosophical theories of mind — Historically, philosophers have dealt with mind in terms of its existence in reality as an ontological entity and in terms of knowledge as an epistemological problem. Plato and Aristotle offered theories on both levels to support ethical doctrines. Descartes in the seventeenth century provided what has been accepted as the classic statement of the mind-body problem for modern philosophy.

Plato — Plato introduced the notion of faculty psychology to account for mind. He recognized a dualism of body and soul. The soul or psyche consisted of three elements or faculties: reason, spirit, and appetite. The reasoning faculty was the avenue to wisdom making possible the good life by its control of the appetite and the exercise of courage when supported by the spirit. Its highest form of expression was reached when the philosopher-king perceived the highest form of good in the realm of Being. Plato was dualistic insofar as he recognized the independent existence of body and soul, but his value structure makes him a monistic idealist.

Aristotle — He differentiated between the mind and the soul, the mind being of an incorporeal nature, capable of dealing with mathematics and philosophy, and having an existence independent of the rest of the soul. The mind is the immortal part of the soul. The rest of the soul is concerned with the body, the control of the senses, and perceives the empirical world. The mind concerns itself with contemplating the highest good, while the practical reason deals with the sensate world and controls the passions. A mind-body psychology and its methods for studying mind.

Descartes[10] — The mind and body exist independently in man though there is interaction through the pineal gland. The possession of mind distinguishes man from animals, which, like the bodies of men, respond to the laws of physics like machines. Since the mind is non-material and without energy, the notion that the mind controlled certain body actions raised difficulties. It had to be abandoned when physicists discovered the conservation of momentum. Descartes' disciple Gaulinox devised the two clock theory of apparent reciprocity to account for the parallelism. The events in each system, the mental and the physical, were determined: the physical by physical causes and the mental by parallel mental causes.

Descartes theory of knowledge based on the "cogito, ergo sum" introduced a subjectivistic element. Knowledge of material objects comes through the mind which through judgment knows reality; knowledge does not come through sense-perception which per se is deceptive.

Descartes and modern physics — In this theory of reality and knowledge lies the rationale for the way modern atomic physics describes reality. Whitehead calls this the "bifurcation of nature" into: (1) *apparent* nature, which is the world of empirical sense perception, a superstructure of which the mind is aware; (2) and into the *foundation* of nature, an underlying foundation of reality which the mind knows only through a conceptual system of molecules and electrons. Some of the implications for philosophy and science resulting from this inherited way of thinking have been suggested.

Scientific theories of mind — Modern psychology has investigated the structure and function of parts of the brain in attempts to describe behavior associated with the mind. Attempts have been made, with some degree of success, to locate particular aspects of mental and physical conduct in particular sections of the brain. Except for radial behaviorists absorbed with mechanical stimulus-response investigation and theory, scientific theory has turned to psychology and its methods for studying mind.

Scientists have compared the human mind to the electronic computers; and in some respects, namely memory, mathematical computation, and particular problem-solving situations, the mechanical brains have been superior. But explanations are needed for intuitive kinds of cognition, for the affective feelings, and the conative drive: the mechanical product is not helpful.

In general, psychology approaches the study of mind to account for human nature and human conduct in two ways: one is through the method of introspection and the other is through observation of behavior. The method of introspection is criticized as being too subjective and beyond verification, testing, and experimentation by more than one investigator. Observation of behavior seems more acceptable; its weakness, however, lies in the remoteness of so many of the private feelings associated with mind.

In recent years the study of mind has been broadened by the theories of Freud and deductions from psycho-analysis and psycho-therapy. Out of them several new theories have been developed; emphasis is frequently directed toward *personality,* a more inclusive term with a long genetic history but

[10] The material on Descartes was taken largely from Bertrand Russell's, *A History of Western Philosophy,* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945, pp. 557-569.

which includes mind, character, temperament, interpersonal relations, and cultural determinants. It is at this point that psychology becomes involved with sociology, psychiatry, and social psychology. Some of the steps taken to integrate these behavioral disciplines will be described below.

4. Current Dualisms.

Biology: mind and brain — Sir Charles Sherrington writes as a natural scientist working in the area of biology.[11] Biology is concerned with living organisms. Mind is a phase of living. Yet, the psycho-physical difficulty prevents scientific investigation. Modern science is concerned with energy. But the mental is not examinable as a form of energy. An impasse exists.

The physiologist examines the brain with electrical techniques, chemical tests involving vitamins, oxygen, glucose, and narcotics. Nerve impulses can be traced and measured. Neurology specializes in studying the brain centers and the nervous system. But this does not help psychiatry.

The mind has three aspects: the cognitive, the affective, and the conative, which together account for thoughts, feelings, and drives. Since they cannot be measured or tested in terms of energy, the natural scientist refuses to be concerned. Sherrington feels that this attitude leaves this all important problem outside the pale of organized, systematic, and disciplined inquiry because of the historical impasse of connecting separate entities: one the physical brain and therefore subject to energy causations, and the other, the mind, recognized as comprising thoughts, feelings, and will.

> ". . . we find ourselves at length pragmatically alongside of general commonsense opinion. That may be taken either as sanity or superficiality or perhaps both."[12]

Sherrington obviously feels that modern science must overcome its historical inadequacy.

It is interesting to note that Freud does not share Sherrington's reluctance to use physical models of causality. His experience in therapy, starting with cases of hysteria, led him to develop a therapy of mind. This theory is being used in psychiatry, along with chemical and neurological techniques in some instances, to treat mental diseases, psychological impairments of adjustment and creativity, and psychosomatic symptoms. Furthermore, it has been exploited by social psychologists, social service professionals, students of modal personality, and a wide variety of social scientists for particular purposes in their areas.

Scientists from other disciplines, including sometimes doctors, belittle the activity as unscientific. Presumably, the objection relies on lack of suitable testing and prediction, as well as on skepticism about the degree of success to be credited to the therapy, and its lack of certainty. It would seem that progress in the study and control of human conduct is being made by this bold concept and its use in therapy. Although the same lack of energy exists for Freud as it does for Sherrington, Freud uses the scientific model of force

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[11] The material on Sherrington was taken from his selection "Man on His Nature" appearing in *Readings in Philosophy of Science,* Wiener, Philip P., editor, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953, pp. 150-157

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 157.

to build his concept. His mind works in terms of physical categories even though his concern is with the mental. His caste of thought is physical.

Parallelism of the mental and physical has been a perplexing aspect of the mind-body problem. For, if Newton's laws of force are correct, motion is caused by a physical force; a force moves a body from a state of rest. Modern science has introduced the notion of energy as a basic concept. But causality is still required. Philosophers of science are helping to solve this dilemma by focusing attention on the event and the field in which it occurs rather than on the basic qualities of individual things. Functions replace causes.

History versus science[13] — R. G. Collingwood argues that

"the science of human nature was a false attempt — falsified by the analogy of natural science — to understand the mind itself, and that, whereas the right way of investigating nature is by the method called scientific, the right way of investigating mind is by the methods of history."

The reason for this distinction lies in the difference in the nature of the problems to which science and history direct themselves. Both study events but human events are different from natural events. The latter are mere phenomena, real, but nevertheless without meaning other than as spectacles to intelligent observation. The scientist perceives the event and conducts a search for its cause by "assigning it to its class and determining the relation between that class and others."

But human affairs, the events with which the historian is concerned, have two sides; they are more than mere phenomena, they have an additional, an inner aspect, the thought of the human agent, ascertainable not by empirical observation but by the historian's act of reconstruction. Thus:

"The processes of nature can therefore be described as sequences of mere events, but those of history cannot. They are not processes of mere events but processes of actions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes of thought: and what the historian is looking for is these processes of thought. All history is the history of thought.

"For history, the object to be discovered is not the mere event, but the thought expressed in it."

The distinction between mental and physical is in the Cartesian tradition.

Is Collingwood really opposed by modern science? — However, modern science tends to perpetuate the distinction by its "bifurcation of nature," its dichotomy into two aspects of reality, that of the substructure consisting of electro-magnetic forces of electrons, protons, mesons, or whatever, and that of the superstructure comprising the phenomenal world of human experience. A distinction is made between the world of concept and the world of percept. Mind and body are divided. The dualism is maintained. Essences and the primacy of ideas are revived. Knowledge is separated from experience; perhaps the latter may confirm it but that is all; there is a reality beyond observable phenomena. Collingwood's thesis is therefore quite consistent with the

[13] The material is based on an article by R. G. Collingwood, "Human nature and human history" take from his book *The Idea of History* and published in *Gadfly*, Volume II: 5, November 1959, Chicago: Great Books Foundation.

dualism of modern physical science. Some of the consequences for soci progress have been suggested.

Mind and social custom — Before leaving Collingwood, it is interesting t note that he speaks of the historian's interest in men's eating, sleeping, an making love, not as natural processes but in the:

> "social customs which they create by their thoughts as a framework withi which these appetites find satisfaction in ways sanctioned by conventio and morality."

His presupposition includes the independent existence of mind which think and *causes* social custom. If Mead is correct, Collingwood is wrong; for th basic and perennial reality of the mind is challenged by the theory of its soci derivation as represented by the "conversation of gestures," "generalize other," and the role of communication. And to the whole field of mind mus be added another ingredient: culture as it operates through its institutions.

Mind and culture[14] — Modern anthropology deals with individual behavio and patterns of group behavior in cultural context: which includes huma ideas, hopes, beliefs and their artifactual and institutional objectifications. I is concerned to relate human psychology, human behavior, and human natur with culture. Tyler sought to explain culture in terms of unchanging law of human nature; human behavior causes culture. Physical science postulate an unchanging physical nature to explain changing physical phenomena an Tyler derived his theory of an unchanging basic human nature to explai changing cultural phenomena by analogy.

Later anthropologists, historians, and social scientists, influenced by notion of causality and determinism, reversed Tyler's position. Seeking to make th social sciences scientific, namely to be able to predict human behavior fro the study of culture, they arrived at theories of thought-determinism. The outdid the natural scientist who limited his determinism to physical event and who left the possibility of freedom of thought open to evaluation by thos with related interests.

So called pure science has been directed toward the nature of matte energy, time, space, and so forth. To the extent that it precluded scientifi interest in human behavior as part of the merely phenomenalistic world, th problem of human freedom was left open. But later, when anthropologist and other social scientists attempted to study human behavior scientifically the prestige of the physical sciences led them to adopt compatible notions o causality, determinism, and prediction: scientific law is based on sequence of events which are invariably caused and can be predicted. Freedom o thought, freedom of conduct, creativity, and other qualities prized by ma were minimized by culture theorists as illusions; instead, underlying cultura forces, like the conceptual world of electrons, conceived as existing behin the mirage of operational experience, were conceived as controlling behavio making a mockery of human purpose and values. The sins of the historica dualism and its attendant epistemology, perpetuated in the abstractions of pur

[14] Based on Bidney, David, *Theoretical Anthropology,* New York: Columbia Univer sity Press, 1953, pp. 178-9, 192-3.

science about the nature of matter, are thus visited on some of the last generation of scientists who seek to work in the area of mind, human nature, and behavior.

5. New Directions: Organisms, Functions, Fields.

Preview — Intellectual dissatisfaction with the mind-body dualism is being voiced in many quarters. Educators, moralists, philosophers and scientists from several disciplines, particularly those concerned with human behavior are making explicit statements. Frequently, they engage in practices which implicitly negate the validity of the historic dualism. There is a feeling of urgency to solve problems which cannot wait. Some are proceeding with programs of action while others provide the philosophical rationale. Politics, economics, education, and mental health demand better insights into the human mind, behavior, values, and goals. Philosophy, education, and anthropology speak of human behavior, personality, and culture in terms of order, process, and goals.[15]

Philosophers of science — Moritz Schlick[16] takes the point of view that the mind-body problem will be clarified from its metaphysical obscurities by linguistic analysis of the words *mental* and *physical.* He points out that physical objects are verified by measurement; the objects are "quantitative coincidences"; the method is objective, inter-sensual, and inter-subjectively valid. And this includes qualities, which like colors and even dreams are psychological concepts: empirical reactions can be objectified by speech or writing. The investigator is interested to formulate and order experiences rather than to analyze the physical or mental event. "Physical" and "mental" are terms describing different ways of ordering reality. They are not the reality.

Feigl[17] equates the mind-body problem with teleology, free choice and determinism, and space localization as pseudo-problems. He points out the modern trend toward monistic approach citing Gestalt psychology, psychosomatic medicine, and cybernetics. And pragmatism, positivism, operationalism, behaviorism, and analytical philosophy are attempts to resolve the problem.

Max Planck takes a relativistic linguistic approach:

". . . the physical and the mental are in no way different from each other. They are the selfsame processes, only viewed from two diametrically opposite directions . . . the body-mind problem has been recognized as another phantom problem.[18]

Parallelism left unanswered the question of interlinkage. Neither Descartes nor his disciples could solve it satisfactorily. But this viewpoint regards the two as aspects of one process. There is no dualism; there is one process.

Whitehead proposes a philosophy nature as organic. Instead of Descartes' dualistic starting point of two sorts of independent substances:

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[15] Brameld, T., *Cultural Foundations of Education,* N.Y.: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1957.

[16] Schlick, Moritz, "On the Relation between Psychology and Physical Concepts," in *Readings in Philosophical Analysis,* N.Y.: Appleton-Century, 1949, pp. 393-407.

[17] Feigl, H., *op. cit.*

[18] Planck, Max, "Phantom Problems in Science," in *Moments of Discovery,* N.Y.: Basic Books, 1958, Volume Two, p. 965.

"The organic starting point is from the analysis of process as the realization of events disposed in an interlocked community. The event is the unit of things real."[19]

Or one may shift one's focus from that of psychology and physiology to that of mathematical physics. The presumption is that there is an electro-magnetic field of activity governed by laws observed in events.

"The science ignores what anything is in itself. Its entities are merely considered in respect to their extrinsic reality, that is to say, in respect to their aspects in other things . . . the intrinsic character of the observer is merely relevant in order to fix the self-identical individuality of the physical entities."[20]

Whatever the approach to the event, there is no concern to describe essences or intrinsic realities of individual things.

Education — Dewey constantly wrote about dualisms and considered them harmful to intellectual and social progress. Wherever he could he sought to expose them to analytic examination, to make explicit the problem. However, he never took them lightly as mere linguistic difficulties. His remarks in a famous essay on the school, the child, and the curriculum is relevant to the problem:

"Profound differences in theory are never gratuitous or invented. They grow out of conflicting elements in a genuine problem. . . . Solution comes only by getting away from the meaning of terms that is already fixed upon and coming to see the conditions from another point of view. But this reconstruction means travail of thought."[21]

Some of Dewey's specific reactions to the mind-body dualism itself were cited above.

Education, ethics, and behavior — The study of mind, human nature, and behavior is central to the purpose of the philosopher of ethics. Invariably he presumes a theory of psychology to account for the behavior he wishes to control to accomplish the good life. Jordan developed a systematic, formal and logical theory of ethics. He sought to use his theory on relating man to his natural environment. The good life consisted of conduct objectifying the relationship in cultural institutions. The act was central; neither the mental state nor the social consequences in terms of a happiness calculus was critical.

A condition of the good life was an educational system directed to knowing the natural environment and the cultural relations. The learning process involves knowledge of how the mind works. With regard to the method of knowing the mind, he states:

"Mind always acts through its body and is known only in and through its actions.

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[19] Whitehead, A. N., *Science and the Modern World, op. cit.*, p. 152.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[21] Dewey, John, *The Child and the Curriculum*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1902, pp. 3-4.

"Mind always acts as a whole or as a unity and is known only as such."[22] Jordan is interested in the manifestations of mind in the act. Observation of its effect on objects, on the actor, and on the cultural relationships determine the mind. Dualistic problems of subjective goodness and motivation are dismissed; objectified action is the mind acting as a unity and this is how it is known.

Psychology and behavior[23] — Tolman defines physiology as a study of the laws determining the *activities* of muscles and glands; psychology the *behavior* of organisms; and sociology the *conduct* of groups of organisms. There is no attempt to find out what muscles are or what mind is or whether there is such a thing as a group mind.

Proposing a method of studying psychology leads him to physiology and sociology; for, he finds it necessary to invoke the Gestalt doctrine. Atomistic analysis is superseded by attention to a field or a whole, whether the subject matter is psychology or physics. Applying this field theory to psychology, he includes in the field physiology, psychology, and sociology. He then focuses attention on functional variables between their processes. At the same time he suggests the dependency of the part on the whole: in order to study psychology you have to look to sociology as well as to physiology. Through behavior, human nature and mind are described. Mind and body are not only integrated within one organism, but the individual organism is then joined with others to form a field.

Social psychology and human behavior[24] — Kurt Lewin is given credit for introducing field theory in social psychology. He emphasizes the social dependency of human behavior. He adopts the field theory of Maxwell in physics as a model. Then he seeks to develop scientific criteria of research for experimental psychology to study human behavior and its interdependence with social facts.

A science should be considered a realm of problems rather than a realm of material; each realm of problems may need its own language system of constructs and laws (such as those of physics, aesthetics, psychology, and sociology); and each one of them refers to the same universe of material. The methodology for research is to be the field-theoretical approach.

The new directions for the study of mind and human nature seem to have several common characteristics. First, they seem to be concerned with the functions, the behavior of organisms rather than with intrinsic qualities of things. Second, the emphasis is on action, process, behavior. Motivation and cause inherent in things are viewed in a new light. Motivation is a function; it is a term used to describe a situation; it is a relation. The focus for observation is the event.

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[22] Jordan, E. *The Good Life,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949, p. 308.

[23] The material here is based on an article by Tolman, Edward C., "Physiology, Psychology, and Sociology," in *Readings in Philosophy of Science,* Wiener, Philip P., editor, *op. cit.,* pp. 226-231.

[24] The material here is based on an article by Lewin, Kurt, "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology," in *Readings in Philosophy of Sciece,* Wiener, Philip P., editor, *op. cit.,* pp. 220-225.

Furthermore, the event finds itself in a field of past, contemporaneous and future events. Panoramically viewed, each is a function of the other. Each needs the other to complete its meaning. The notion of a field encompassing the events becomes relevant to physics, psychology, and social psychology.

Science, evolution, society, and the mind — A most penetrating study of the social dependence of mind is offered by George Herbert Mead, who was concerned with the meaning and purpose of the scientific method and scientific research, the significance of the theory of evolution for an explanation of mind as an emergent from non-mental sources, and the philosophy of pragmatism. Mead's thesis is central to the new trends in the study of mind and human behavior.

According to Mead the opposition to scientific study of the mind and human behavior arises out of a misconception of the nature of science. This in turn rests on the historic dualism of which Descartes' statement is the model. In order to progress in the study of the mind, several steps must clear the way: (1) scientific research employing the experimental method in the solution of problems must be established as the function and meaning of science; (2) the theory of organic evolution must be developed to explain reflective intelligence and mind as an emergent from a non-mental past; (3) the dualistic approach must be abandoned; (4) mind must be studied behavioristically, avoiding, however, radical reduction to mechanicalism; (5) to progress in the study of the mind, physical science must liberate itself from obstacles created by dualistic theories; and (6) a rationale must be provided for mind as a social emergent forming the link between psychology and sociology. Together, these statements should provide a philosophical and scientific foundation for the advancement of the knowledge of mind and behavior and for further experimental research to solve human problems.

1. The function of science.[25] Aristotelian science was dogmatic and deductive. The dogma consisted of a general statement as a universal law or principle. Deductions were made to provide examples or individual instances. The law was one frequently derived from authority. It was held to be true, eternal, perennial. The function of the scientist was to accommodate the individual experience or observation or situation to the universal law. The individual observer's duty was to produce support for the accepted belief. Modern science, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of revising the belief to include a previously unexplained experience. Beliefs are held tentatively. The scientist is concerned not to support the belief but to clarify, enlarge, and revise it in the light of his experience with new problems or exceptions, providing that the new theory is testable and confirmable by independent sources.

In the light of this approach to the function of science, the concentration of scientific activity on physical science is an unwarranted and cowardly parochialism. To avoid the study of thought and feelings on the ground that scientific method does not deal with them is to misstate the scientific method. Or to avoid attention on the ground that mind and body are different areas

[25] The material here is based on Clayton, Alfred S., *Emergent Mind and Education*. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 194[illegible] pp. 1-27.

is again a misconception of the function of science. Beliefs about mind and human nature must be examined and revised to explain and predict what is now unexplained and unpredictable. An exception to a belief or conflicting theories for proposed conduct represent problems calling for scientific reconstruction of existing accepted principles; and this is a continuing process.

2. Mind as an evolutionary emergent.[26] The genesis of mind out of non-mental earlier biological forms into an emergent new form with new attributes such as reflective intelligence and affective feelings is central to Mead's thesis. The notion of emergence in the evolutionary development of new forms removes several apparent difficulties to the study of mind and behavior. It provides a foundation for a functional approach to apparently inconsistent entities such as mind and body. It removes dogma and speculation as starting-points for study. It reaffirms the notion of continuity between the material and mental. However, evolutionary theory is to be used to emphasize the emergence of mind as new and not to provide a rationale for fruitless physical reductionism.

3. Abandonment of the dualism.[27] The Cartesian dualism provided an uncritical rationale for the preoccupation of science with the physical world of nature. The problem of knowing, that is the relationship between the object and the mind, was obscured. Teleology, vitalism, cause and effect, certainty, and freedom for human behavior created irritating and insoluble antagonisms between conflicting social groupings.

Furthermore, a theory of dualistic entities is unscientific. It postulates a mind as a part of the human individual in order to explain and control his conduct. The assumption is neither warranted nor fruitful in terms of science as a research instrument to solve problems and revise beliefs.

4. Behavioristic approach to mind.[28] Mead premises the evolutionary emergence of mind in a group of organisms which developed into the human species through a common experience in an environment of which all members were a part. He relies on conditions of communication by symbol, gesture, and particularly language to support his description. Reflective intelligence, cognition, and affective feelings are what they are, operate as they do, and will change as they will in terms of the environmental experience of individuals; and, what is most critical to remember is that the development of social relationships is a most important aspect of the field environment. Mind is social. Psychology and sociology are two sides of a coin. The individualistic approach to the study of mind in terms of a pre-existing independent entity causing either individual or social patterns of conduct is inadequate; it leads nowhere. Faculty psychology, introspective psychology, and social psychology starting from a premise of mind as a private and native endowment offer fruitless prospects.

Radical behaviorism as represented by Watson has inadequacies. It is too mechanical, thereby failing to develop an empirically true picture of the mind. Reflective behavior, imagery, affective feelings are not adequately explained. Mead is greatly concerned with the aesthetic and affective feelings, the peculiarly human and private aspects of human experience. Thus, although he

[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] *Ibid.*

insists on behaviorism as against introspection he would not abandon the latter in areas where it can serve a useful purpose.[29]

5. The liberation of modern physical science. Mead describes three factors influencing the conception of the mind since the Renaissance. Both philosophy and science must overcome the effects of the dualistic heritage before new directions in the study of the mind and behavior can proceed successfully.

First, is the "bifurcation of nature," discussed above, into a conceptual substructure that causes an empirical superstructure that man lives in. The microcosmic world is conceptualized by the mind; the empirical world is perceived. The social consequences of this dualism have been discussed. In terms of theory of the mind, it may lead to all or some of the following: to an unsatisfactory idealism; to a negation of scientific concern for the mind in the experiential world; or to a belittlement of the role the mind is capable of playing in the cultural environment.

Second, is the relation of the object of experience to the experiencing individual. The problem of knowledge and the reliability of experience besets the philosopher. Relating the object to the human being results in meaningless parallelism of body motions and mental states. Only an organic approach emphasizing the event, the act, can overcome this.

Third, provision in theories of mind must be made for study of the "content of imagery" and "especially all the aesthetic and other emotional and affective character of things." Physical science has omitted these most important secondary and peculiarly human qualities because they have no place in an abstracted physical environment.

Modern science must thus correct its picture of reality. It must make it really real in an empirical and operational sense and not in just an abstract conceptual sense. Daily living and common sense problems must not be relegated to a secondary position on the scientific agenda. Living in the popular sense of the word must be recognized as a most important aspect of reality. The old dualism reserved for other sources of authority the control of the aesthetic and moral aspects of life. What was Caesar's was rendered unto Caesar. Modern physical science and pure science cannot have its cake and eat it too. It must not assume responsibility for only half of reality, the material and physical and then sneer at human tension and conflict. Not only is such an attitude unscientific, it is also irresponsible.

6. Mind: a social emergent. Mead's behavioristic study of the mind as an evolutionary emergent leads him to view it as a social phenomenon.

> "It is absurd to look at the mind simply from the standpoint of the individual human organism; for although it has its focus there, it is essentially a social phenomenon; even its biological functions are primarily social."

Mead starts his analysis of the biological act at the point in the evolutionary continuum where the biological organism has a central nervous system and sense organs have emerged. The organism is in a field consisting of its natural

[29] Mead, George Herbert, *The Philosophy of the Act*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938, pp. 357-360.

[30] Strauss, Anselm, editor, *The Social Philosophy of George Herbert Mead*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934, p. 211.

environment, other organisms, and itself. Interaction ensues via attitudes, which are tensions or tendencies of the organism to act in a particular way given a particular condition. This exchange constitutes a conversation of gestures in which the organisms adjust to each other as they fulfill their own attitudes. It is a social adjustment.

In the course of evolution language emerged as the communicating gesture. And here the gesture becomes a significant symbol, meaning that the speaker takes into account his own awareness of how the listener should respond to the communication. This is reflexiveness:

> "the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself"

and by means of it

> "the whole social process is thus brought into the experience of the individuals involved. . . . Reflexiveness, then, is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development of mind."[31]

And finally, when man internalizes as a part of his attitude the attitudes of society towards him in his role as a member, when he is aware of what is expected of him and what response will be made to his conduct, he has integrated as an essential part of his personality what Mead calls "the generalized other." His conduct represents a complex of biological impulse, habits, social customs, tradition, interpersonal relationships, and reflexive intelligence functioning within the conditions of the field. Mind is social.

Conclusion — Pervasive effects of the mind-body dualism on the development of science have been indicated. Limitations on the scope of science in terms of social problems are being challenged. Mind, human nature, and human behavior are now being studied in a scientific fashion. Previous objections have been overcome by philosophers, scientists, and by philosophers of science; frequently, one man operates in two roles in this respect.

That new directions are needed would seem to be obvious to an observer of the cultural scene. To withdraw from the fray the most powerful weapon in the arsenal, namely the rational mind using the scientific method, would seem to be foolish and irresponsible. Objectivity, ivory-tower pursuit of pure knowledge, and disdain for the practical cannot be justified at this time. Those who maintain such a position in the name of science must re-evaluate the meaning of science in the interest of their own ideal if for no other reason. The philosopher of science has been and will continue to be helpful in this respect.

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VALUES AND THE TEACHER

by
CHARLES S. CLAYMAN

VALUES AND THE TEACHER

It is to the personal and intimate, the inextricable relationship between education and values that this exploration addresses itself. Addressing our attention to the nature of values, their origin and subsequent manifestation in the behavior of persons, we shall attempt to discern some of the more salient implications for educational theory and practice in the professional preparation of teachers.

A set of interrelated assumptions provide the framework in which the author's research is guided. (1) Our lives are saturated with values — of the good and the bad; the right and the wrong; the beautiful and the ugly; the material and the immaterial, to name but several. (2) Values provide the basic premises, the unconscious assumptions upon which our individual and social behavior is patterned. (3) The patterned behavior of a group of people is perpetuated through their educational institutions as well as other designated social agencies. (4) Patterns of behavior, if inconsistent, incompatible, or paradoxical, tend to result in social and consequently in educational confusion. (5) The school, instead of perpetuating conflicting values, could become a "valuating-center" for the transevaluation of cultural values; and (6) It is incumbent upon teacher training institutions to prepare the prospective pedagogue with an awareness of and a keen sensitivity to the values implicitly and explicitly entertained by mankind.

Having established the broad outlines of the perspective embraced by this exploration it behooves us to delineate the concept of "values." What is a value, how is it determined and by whom? Where do we look for values? Are values relative to time and place? Or are they universally held?

The dean of American anthropologists, Alfred Kroeber, has best summed up the prevailing anthropological view with regard to the necessity of studying the phenomenon of value:

> "It follows that if we refuse to deal with values, we are refusing to deal with what has most meaning in particular cultures as well as in human culture seen as a whole . . . (In) apprehending cultures the most essential thing to apprehend is their values, because without these (we) will not know either toward what the cultures are slanted or around what they are organized."[1]

Another anthropologist who has treated of values in scholarly detail is the late Clyde Kluckhohn. He submits the thesis that a value differs from a belief in that a value is a commitment to action in situations involving possible alternatives constrained within a cultural framework. A value involves more than a preference, rather it is one which is felt and/or considered to be

justified "morally," or by reasoning or aesthetic judgment.[2] All cultures exemplify a spectrum of values which may be classified as dominant, deviant and variant. The value-orientation of a given culture is deeply rooted, mainly unconscious, and is so pervasive that it markedly affects the patterns of behavior and thought of people in all areas of activity. A value-orientation is a "philosophy behind the way of life of every individual and of relatively homogeneous groups at any given point in their history," and gives some sense "of coherence or unity to living."[3] Another view by Florence Kluckhohn, the wife of the late anthropologist, has designed a conceptual scheme which permits a systematic ordering of cultural value orientations within the framework of common human-universal problems. Three fundamental assumptions underlie her attempt to classify value orientations: (1) There is a limited number of common human problems for which all people at all times must find some solution; (2) Variability in solutions of all problems is neither limitless nor random but is definite variability within a range of possible solutions, and (3) Every society has, in addition to its dominant profile of value orientations, numerous variant or substitute profiles. These assumptions provide a coherent framework with which to discover and understand the values of any culture.

The concept of the "basic value orientation" can serve the teacher well as an operational tool by which to better analyze, diagnose, and synthesize the broad organized conception of human relations, of the desirable and non-desirable in man's relations towards himself, towards society, and towards nature. It is this integrated set of attitudes both conscious and subconscious which gives meaning to any given community and which serves as the basic premises for perpetuating its conception of what is desirable in the "good life." The key term is "desirable." We may consider a value as "any implicit or explicit conception of what any individual or group considers to be desirable, and which thereby influences the means and ends through which the desirable may be actively obtained.[4] A value, depending upon its incorporation and the degree to which it is held by a group of people, becomes ostensibly more than a belief, rather a commitment to action, and may be regarded as necessary to the group's survival. Values which are, however, logically inconsistent with each other may be adjusted by limiting their expression to particular culturally recognized situations. Furthermore, the individual within his culture can hold a series of conflicting values as long as the behavior patterns which are related to their expression do not themselves involve direct conflict. In other words, when an individual or group maintains values which appear incompatible, we ascribe the resultant situation as one of ambivalence. American culture has tended to foster ambivalent attitudes with respect to: competition — cooperation; honesty — being a smooth operator; dignity of human life — war; dominance — submissiveness; nationalism — internationalism . . . to name but a few. Now, conflicting desirabilities tend to promote cultural confusion and when translated into educational theory and practice make for anything but positive choices in terms of curriculum design; methods of teaching, and at bottom, of a philosophy of education.

How does this affect the school? Viewed as an agency of enculturation, the school attempts to create an environment in which to present the student with an integrated view of the culture, accepting its basic premises, its basic value orientation. What values will the school perpetuate? Which ones will it

seek to modify? Will the classroom espouse the "basic value orientation" at the conceptual level bereft of translation into effective operational procedures? Moreover, how will consensus on values in the classroom and in the community be achieved, and by what criteria will the student evaluate conflicting and competing rivals for what is desirable? Questions such as these have enjoyed a rather lengthy tenure in the philosopher's speculative workshop, while of more recent vintage, the anthropologist has attempted to come to grips with them.

Relative or Universal

There has been and is taking place today in academic and lay circles a discussion which bulks large in its implications for the school, for the larger culture of which it is an integral part, and indeed, for mankind. The discussion concerns itself with what criteria for judging values do we now possess, or if not, which could be established. Explicitly, the question which for so long has plagued the philosopher, the statesman, the scientist, and more recently, the educator, resolves itself into a polarity, namely, are values relative or universal? To what degree do we possess data with regard to a verifiable core or values common to all cultures? Or must we accept the logical implications of maintaining contradictory ethical views without either being mistaken thereby accepting any cultural pattern as equally valid;

Philosophic approaches to the problem of ethical value have tended to lean heavily on supernatural sanctions or vaguely defined concepts of the "good, the true and the beautiful." Now, traditional morality has rested upon supernaturalist or non-naturalistic bases, a moral absolutism which insisted on a theological world-picture of universal values. This conception of moral absolutes has been seriously challenged, threatened, and overturned by the doctrine of ethical relativism supported by its anthropological hand-maiden, cultural relativism. Rejecting morality as a supra-human product, setting aside the philosophical conception of a fixed and eternal world, and burying the concept of universal values, the essence of the relativist doctrine is "indeterminancy, the fact of no definite answers available or achievable."[5]

The ethical relativist argues thus: our scientific investigations have proved that there exist no ethical principle which is acknowledged by all human societies. Ethical values, he maintains, are functions of the society in which they originate. To ask the question, "what is morally good and morally bad?" has meaning only in relation to a moral system of a given society. Since we lack absolute criteria by which the value system of a given society can be judged objectively, there is no possibility of deciding which value systems are morally better. The anthropologists have maintained that this point of view is supported by the "facts of life." Cultures, we are told, differ in their customs and attitudes, in their methods of instructing the youth, and in the assumption of roles to be performed by individuals within each particular way of life. Thus, culture presents the criteria from which men must choose, select and reject in order to lend rationale to their aspirations, their hopes and fears. Values, therefore, are relative to time and place, are culturally circumscribed and equally valid. To make any judgment as to the relative merits of any value-system we would be guilty of comparing the "incomparable" and if we did venture an opinion, would be guilty of ethnocentrism — judging others by our standards.

Relativism, regarded as a philosophy of culture, in assuming the dignity and equal validity among all cultures, opens the way for an empirical objective study of the "cakes of custom." Objectivity and tolerance, taken as norms of study, are prerequisite to any understanding of diverse values. If the teacher of teachers accepts this position is he committed to a role of ethical neutrality in judging all ways of life as equally valid? By what defensible criteria can the teacher-in-training validate the values of self, community, of his culture vis-a-vis other cultures?

The question, are values relative or universal, presents the student with a two-values orientation in which the answer has to be either-or. The problem to become a proper concern for education, must be placed on a continuum ranging from similarity on the one end to dissimilarity on the other. Viewed in this perspective, values are both relative and universal, and we begin to break ground in our attempt to bring into the open those values which may be held in common by all men.

Values and the Teacher

Does the teacher-training institution have a responsibility to deal with the problems raised by cultural relativism and universalism? The answer is unequivocally, yes! If we assume that the major purpose of the school is to acquaint students with those aspects of life with which they must cope as cultural beings, and that central to all human behavior is "values," then the teacher-in-training must deal with this complex and multiple phenomenon. But the question remains, in what manner will the teacher training institution treat the findings of anthropological investigation and philosophical speculation? what approach will be stressed — either-or, or, both-and? What I am suggesting is that knowledge of subject matter and of methodology is not enough; knowledge without commitment is educational irresponsibility. I am suggesting that the teacher-training institution become a center for the trans-evaluation of cultural values, in order to extend to the teacher the opportunity to study his own values in relation to the values of other teachers and in relation to the values of other cultures. In this way the teacher can gain invaluable insight into the "nature and nurture of man," who, strikingly diverse in his patterns of behavior, may exhibit common values.

This proposal for a "value-centered" teacher education would take for its foundation the best available knowledge of man as submitted by the natural sciences, the behavioral sciences, especially anthropology, and philosophy. Objectivity and tolerance are the major desiderata in assuming the different value-patterns which mankind in its apparent diversity represents. Fundamental to the proposal are several desired outcomes in the behavior of the teacher; it is hoped that the teacher will evidence a more inclusive perspective and greater sensitivity and depth of understanding with respect to (1) his values; (2) the values of his contemporaries; (3) the basic value orientation of his culture; (4) the values common to most cultures; (5) possible criteria for the evaluation of values, intra- and inter-cultural; (6) the nature of man as viewed in various historical periods with emphasis on the contemporary world; and (7) how he, the student, acquired values, how he is motivated to action by values and how he can create values.

It is incumbent upon teacher training institutions to explore conflicting value commitments and seek some comprehensive theory of human values with

which to guide students in the resolution of conflicts. In no small measure will the prospective pedagogue be a philosopher with a bent for the anthropological vision.

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RELIGION IN THE SCHOOLS OF GREAT BRITAIN

by
LAWRENCE P. CREEDON

Scope

This paper will consider the place of religious education within the schools of Great Britain. In the past 150 years English education has undergone a change from church domination to government domination; consequently, the role played by religion has changed. The paper will be subdivided into two parts:

1. A brief review of education in Great Britain *PRIOR to 1944*. In keeping within the context of the paper the role of religion will be stressed.
2. A review of the religious education provisions of the Education Act of 1944.

Appropriate, but by no means detailed, reflections will be cast upon the American scene and the comparative role of religion in American public education.

No attempt has been made to justify, criticize, or in any way evaluate the British program. If a bias exists in the paper it is as a result of the materials used in research. Practically all were obtained from the British Information Agency, New York City, *via* the Boston University Inter-Library Loan service. As the purpose of the paper is to review the provisions of the Act of 1944 and their application relative to religious instruction in the schools of Great Britain, no effort was to search out material critical of the program.

Prior to 1944

Compared to the long history of Great Britain, tax-supported education is still in its infancy. As late as 1833 the question was under discussion as to whether the House of Commons should make its first grant (20,000 pounds) for education. The idea was so revolutionary to English society that it even found opposition amongst the progressivists of the day. One such spokesman observed:[1]

> Take two men, one that can plow and make hurdles and be a good shepherd, and one that can plow and read, and the first is the better man.

The charge was frequently heard that education was responsible for making the rising generation of workmen restless and discontented with their lot in life. It was reasoned that "the scarcity of agricultural laborers and the decay of agriculture was a direct result of the overschooling of laborers' children."[2]

[1] Benjamin S. Winchester, *Religious Education and Democracy* (The Abington Press, 1917), p. 17.
[2] *Ibid.*

This last criticism is not unlike contemporary objections being raised on the Russian scene.

The Church of England, custodian of education in accordance with provisions of the 1662 Act of Uniformity, was also opposed to a nationally supported and directed system of education. The Church regarded the drive as an attack upon itself and upon religion in general. The argument used by the Anglican Church in the early decades of the 19th century is an attempt to retain its primal position in education was very similar to that used more than a century later when it and other religious communions endorsed the provisions of the Act of 1944. The earlier argument was as follows:[3]

> All that is happening in the matter of education is a call to the church to put her strength and to do valiant battle for her principles in the schools. Our work is to teach children the facts of our religion, the doctrines of our religion, the duties of our religion. We must teach them the facts of our religion that they may grow to be intelligent Christians, not ignorant as heathens; the doctrines, that they may not be Christians only, but churchmen; the duties, that they may not be churchmen only, but communicants. The last, in fact, is the object at which we are uniformly to aim, the training of the young Christian for full Communion with the church, and as preliminary to that, a training for confirmation. The whole time of a child should gradually lead up to this. . . . The time has come when probably the whole fate of the Church of England, humanly speaking, will turn upon the hold she may have upon the rising generation. Political changes are giving more and more power to the people. If the church has the people with her, she will be beyond all danger from adverse legislation. Let her, then, educate the children of the people in her principles.

From 1814 to 1870 a system of elementary schools established and maintained primarily through subscription developed. These schools were usually affiliated with the Established Church and since 1833 had received partial support from the government. In 1870 the Elementary Education Act was passed and England took its first giant stride in development of a tax-supported school system. At this time the "Dual System" of Schools began. The Dual System allowed two types of Elementary Schools, one provided by "Voluntary agencies (churches) and the other provided and maintained by money from taxes.[4]

The Act of 1870 provided for the election of local School Boards to maintain tax-supported schools within school districts and in accordance with the law. The Church of England recognized the Board Schools as a threat and opposed their establishment. The Church feared that its schools would eventually be supplanted by such schools and that education would then become not only nonsectarian, but secular and "godless." The Church's concern resulted in the managers of the Board Schools "securing for these schools constant and systematic religious instruction."

Another result of the controversy was the incorporation into the Act of 1870 of a "Conscience Clause." It is often referred to as the Cowper-Temple

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[4] *Education in Great Britain* (British Information Services, Rockefeller Plaza, New York, 1958), p. 4.

Clause and has been retained in every piece of educational legislation, including the Act of 1944. In essence the clause provides that:[5]

> It shall not be required as a condition of any child being admitted into or continuing in the school, that he shall attend or abstain from attending any Sunday school, or any place of religious worship, or that he shall attend any religious observance or any instruction in religious subjects in the school or elsewhere, from which observance or instruction he may be withdrawn by his parent, or that he shall, if withdrawn by his parent, attend the school on any day exclusively set apart for religious observance by the religious body to which his parents belong. . . .
>
> The time or times during which any religious observance is practiced, or instruction in religious subjects is given, at any meeting of the school shall be either at the beginning or the end of such meeting, and shall be inserted in a time-table to be approved by the Education Department, . . . and any scholar may be withdrawn by his parent from such observance or instructions without forfeiting any of the other benefits of the school. . . . No religious catechism or religious formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination shall be taught in the school.

That the Conscience Clause is a cornerstone of religious liberty legislation in Great Britain is without dispute; however, its application in practice must be understood within the context of its setting. It is English legislation and connotates a different meaning to an Englishman than it would to an American. The Syllabus of Religious Instruction of the Leed Council Schools, 1904, will suffice as an illustration. The Syllabus provided that[6]

> The first half-hour of each day shall be devoted to religious instruction. The schools shall be opened by the singing of a hymn from the hymn book provided by the Education Committee, and by offering the Lord's prayer, and the prayers for opening of school. . . . The door of the schoolroom is to be closed promptly at nine o'clock, and no child admitted until after prayers. . . . The door is then to be opened for late scholars, and from that time until 9:30 religious instruction is to be given in accordance with the Committee's syllabus, which must be strictly adhered to.
>
> Typical morning prayers from the Leed's Syllabus reads:[7]
>
> O merciful Father, forgive, we pray thee, our past sins and negligence, and grant us the grace of the Holy Spirit to renew our hearts, that we may amend our lives according to thy Holy Word, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.
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> Bless, O Lord, in mercy all our dear parents, relations, teachers, school fellows, and friends; may we be kind one to another, and so live together in this life that in the world to come we may have life everlasting. We ask all in the name of Jesus Christ our Lord, who hath taught us when we pray to say "Our Father, etc."

[5] Benjamin S. Winchester, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[6] Syllabus of Religious Instruction. Leeds Council Schools, 1904.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 160.

The Conscience Clause directed that, "No religious catechism or religious formulary which is distinctive of any particular denomination shall be taught in the schools." However, the Leed's Syllabus of 1904 provided a three year program of religious instruction including the following:[8]

First Year: Books of Exodus, Joshua, and Judges.
Second Year: First and Second Books of Samuel and St. Luke's Gospel.
Third Year: First and Second Books of Kings and Acts of the Apostles.

The study published in 1954 by The Institute of Christian Education observed that it has been considered legal to teach the doctrines of the Apostles' Creed in English Schools since 1870.[9]

Thus, it can be appreciated that the English understanding of "distinctive religious formulary" was, and is, quite different than the American concept. Recently United States courts in separate actions, in New York and Florida, have been asked to declare the New York Regents' Prayer and the Lord's Prayer as being "distinctive" of religious sectarianism and thus ineligible for use in the public schools.[10] On 17 October 1960, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York ruled that the Regent's Prayer was permissible in the public schools of the State. It reads:

Almighty God we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our teachers, and our country.

In 1902 the British Parliament passed an Education Act that is recognized as the cornerstone of the educational system in England. Until that time voluntary schools had been enrolling more students than the Board Schools provided for by the Act of 1870. Church of England authorities petitioned the government that while the church schools were enrolling most of the students they were operating at a financial loss as subscriptions and government grants did not provide enough funds to meet the cost of operation. The Act of 1902 abolished the school boards and instituted local educational authorities empowered to provide all schools within the district with full tax-support. In order to qualify for aid Voluntary schools had to allow the educational authority to supervise the secular subjects taught and pass on the qualifications of the faculty. The managers of the religious-orientated schools were still allowed to stipulate the religious instruction to be given and were allowed to pass on the religious qualifications of the teachers. Provisions of the Conscience Clause were retained, no student was required to attend a religious exercise contrary to the dictates of his conscience.

Members of the Free Churches objected to the Act of 1902, fearing that as a result the Church of England would once more return to a place of primacy in education. Furthermore, they objected to being taxed to support schools under the control of the Anglican Church. Supporters of the Act reasoned that justice demanded that the schools of the Established Church be supported as they had carried the full burden of responsibility prior to 1870. They also pointed out that if the existing voluntary schools were forced to

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[9] *Religious Education in Schools* (Institute of Christian Education, 1954), p. 47.

[10] *Quincy Patriot Ledger*, 18 October 1960; *America*, 7 August 1960.

close it would cost the government at least 50,000,000 pounds to establish schools to replace them.[11]

The arguments, pro and con, strongly resemble the current positions taken by advocates and opponents of support for United States parochial schools. In 1936 Congressman Joseph McCormack estimated that Catholic parochial schools saved United States taxpayers one billion a year in money that would ordinarily have to go to the support of public education. In March, 1959, the *New York Times* reported that enrollment in Catholic schools had climbed to more than 4.8 million students. The Catholic argument for financial aid runs that at one time sociological reasons might have been used to rationalize against government aid to parochial schools but that non-support has never been morally justifiable. The opposing view reasons that parents exercise a free choice when they send their children to parochial schools and as a result they should not expect any government assistance.

Both the United States and Great Britain entered into a consideration of tax support for church schools at about the same time. England has moved close to solution of its problem while the United States is still attempting to define the national goals of its schools in relation to religion.

With the passage of the Education Act of 1944, Great Britain entered into its present era in tax-supported education. The Act makes religious instruction mandatory in all tax-supported schools and it is to a closer scrutinization of the provisions for religious education that we now turn.

Provisions for Religious Instruction in the Education Act of 1944

All schools deriving full or partial support from tax funds are committed to a program of religious instruction. The Act of 1944 has made it explicitly clear that religious instruction is not to be considered marginal; it is to be placed on a par with other subjects in the curriculum. Sixteen years have passed since the Act of 1944 became law and public opinion is still behind the program of religious education.

Provisions incumbent upon the present act were first presented as a part of the 1938 Spens Report. The report concluded Great Britain was a nation that had traditionally believed that man and all the Universe had been created by a Supreme Being. It further concluded that Christianity was the faith of the overwhelming majority of the people and was thus entitled to full recognition in the educational program.[12] Public opinion was in favor of giving religious education a definite place in the life of the schools. Professor W. O. Lester Smith summarized the British feeling as follows:[13]

> Something like a revolution has taken place in our attitude to religious education. Controversy has been displaced by peace and goodwill. For years intense sectarian feeling made it difficult to talk about the religious elements in school life without provoking a storm; . . . At last this unhappy controversial phase has passed. . . . We can now discuss the problems of religious

[11] Winchester, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

[12] *Religious Education in the Schools, op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. ix.

teaching as freely as those of any other branch of the curriculum, and this represents a tremendous gain for religious education.

Anglican Bishop Spencer Leeson attributed the desire for a return of religion to English education to lessons learned during World War Two. The Bishop reasoned that the war had brought on a spiritual crisis within the nation and the people realized that they had fought to maintain the Christian orientation and tradition of England.[14]

The intention of the religious education provisions of the Act of 1944 was to insure that each boy and girl be instructed systematically and adequately in the basic beliefs of Christianity. The Ministry of Education pamphlet entitled *Citizens Growing Up,* states that the most secure foundation for the building of true and enduring citizenship rests on an understanding of Christian beliefs.[15]

Supporters of the Act and the Ministry of Education agree that one of the most important goals of the program is to increase Church membership.[16] Margaret Avery in her volume *Religious Education in the Secondary Modern School,* points out that at present it is fashionable in England for adults not to go to church and as a result it has become increasingly hard to interest teenagers in religion and church membership.[17] A 1957 Gallup poll conducted in England concluded that only 9% of these baptized and raised as Anglicans went to church. However, only 6% of the same sampling considered themselves atheists. More than 75% believed in a personal God and 54% believed in a life hereafter.[18] It might be of some significance to point out that the Gallup poll study was made thirteen years after the enactment of the Act of 1944.

The religious education program authorized by the Act of 1944 did not meet with unanimous approval. There were those who felt that its provisions would never be taken seriously by the people and things would be done on much of a voluntary basis as before. It was felt that at least 65% to 70% of the teachers would refuse to take part in the program. Under the Conscience Clause teachers were protected as well as the scholars.[19] Time has proven the pessimists to be in error.

According to Bishop Leeson the range and scope of the Act of 1944 was broader than any previous educational legislation. The main provisions of the Act are five: (1) a daily Act of Worship attended by students and faculty in a body to be required, (2) a program of regular religious instruction made mandatory in all State-maintained schools, (3) little provision made for the construction of new sectarian schools, (4) the Conscience Clause of 1870, extended to include teachers, (5) regular classroom teachers will give the religious instruction. Subsequent legislation enacted in 1946 and 1953 eased the

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[14] Spencer Leason, D.D., *Christian Education Reviewed* (Longmans, Green and Company, New York), 1957, p. 27.

[15] *Religious Education in the Schools, op. cit.,* pp. 8 and 9.

[16] *Ibid.,* Leeson, *op. cit.,* p. 63.

[17] Margaret Avery, *Religious Education in the Secondary Modern School* (Religious Education Press), p. 20.

[18] *Quincy Patriot Ledger,* 8 June 1957.

[19] *Religious Education in the Schools, op. cit.,* pp. 1 and 2.

burden against new sectarian school construction and at present such schools are able to get government funds, but within limitations.[20]

The Act of 1944 provided Great Britain with an opportunity to ring the death toll on the Dual System of schools which had developed as a result of the Act of 1870. Voluntary schools were given a choice, they could allow themselves to become "Controlled Schools" operating under close supervision by the Local Educational Authority, or they could remain "Aided Schools." In Controlled Schools the L.E.A. assumes full financial support of the institution and appoints two-thirds of the school managers. In an Aided School situation the L.E.A. and the school managers each assume one-half of the financial burden for running the school; however, the Voluntary organization remains in control by appointing two-thirds of the school managers.

There is some feeling that the government would prefer the existing voluntary schools to elect controlled status, but the Church of England prefers the Aided program. The late Bishop Leeson felt that after six or ten years in a denominational school the child would receive in his "growing soul the dye that does not wash out."[21]

The Daily Act of Worship: Under the Act of 1870 the daily Act of Worship was in reality nothing more than an opening exercise. Under the present law it has become much more and if church spokesmen have their way it will become increasingly important in the life of the school. Whenever possible it is to be attended by the whole school family — students, faculty and administrators. Under ideal arrangement it will take place in the school chapel, but if none is available then in a suitable place within the school or in a nearby church.[22] Bishop Leeson was a strong advocate of school chapels. He felt that if the Common Act of Worship was really to be considered as an integral part of the curriculum then it should be held in adequate and appropriate surroundings: a chapel.

The service is to be inter-denominational and is to be conducted by the headmaster. Occasionally some L.E.A.'s have permitted the schools to invite a local clergyman to officiate. An immediate goal of the Common Act of Worship is increased church membership.[23]

Each Local Educational Authority is responsible for developing its own Act of Worship. The major limiting factor being that it be kept inter-denominational in form and content. The Institute of Christian Education study observed that:[24]

> To arrange a common act of worship is to provide the conditions in which those who take part may experience the reality of God and find themselves humbled, exalted, gladdened, and strengthened as they offer their praises and their prayers together to the God and Father Lord Jesus Christ.

In the main the Act of Worship follows a set pattern. It is based on a traditional English combination of hymn, prayer and reading. In many in-

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[20] Leeson, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-31.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.

[22] *Religious Education in the Schools, op. cit.*, pp. 93-95.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 89.

stances the reading is not confined to Holy Scripture, but might include appropriate prose or verse from another source. Occasionally brief talks delivered by the headmaster or a student are included. Further variation is provided by instrumental selections, choral speaking and special observances of Christian holidays.[25]

In the United States the entire concept of a Common Act of Worship would be challenged as unconstitutional. The announced English aim of increasing church membership would be looked upon in the United States as a violation of the First Amendment provision against an established church. Expenditures for school chapels would certainly be challenged as would the holding of any school function in a church. On several occasions objections have been raised against holding United States high school baccalaureate exercises in churches.[26]

Although Christmas celebrations are commonplace in United States public schools seldom a year goes by that they do not generate a great amount of controversy in the press.[27]

Agreed Syllabus: Central to the Act of 1944 were provisions for Agreed Syllabuses for use in religious education. Each L.E.A. was empowered to originate a syllabus of religious instruction to be used in all the schools of the district.

Although not demanded by law Agreed Syllabi were common prior to the Act of 1944. As far as can be determined the first Agreed Syllabus was used in West Riding in 1904.[28] By 1940 most of the 317 Local Educational Authorities had an Agreed Syllabus.[29] Compilation of the Syllabus is a responsibility of the L.E.A., but as a general rule local clergymen representing the Established and Free Churches are called in to assist in its development.

The purpose of the Syllabus is to insure that the religion taught in the non-sectarian maintained schools and that taught in the aided schools is the ". . . Christianity which all the churches profess." An aided school may continue to teach its sectarian code, but if students in attendance are not adherents to that faith then the school must make provisions for providing such students with the L.E.A.'s Agreed Syllabus. Margaret Avery summarizes the goal of the program as follows:[30]

> . . . children . . . may gain knowledge of the common Christian faith held by their fathers for nearly 2000 years; may seek for themselves in Christianity principles which give a purpose in life and a guide to all its problems; and may find inspiration, power and courage to work for their own welfare, for that of their fellow creatures and for the growth of God's Kingdom.

The Institute of Christian Education has endorsed the concept of Agreed

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[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 104-5.

[26] *Church and State* (POAU), July, 1953, p. 1: July, 1957, p. 7.

[27] *Pilot* (Boston), 3 and 10 December, 1960; *Christian Century*, 14 December, 1960.

[28] Leeson, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

[29] *Religious Education in the Schools, op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

[30] Margaret Avery, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Syllabuses noting that they testify that Christian doctrine has not been tacked onto the curriculum as an orphan child.

Bishop Leeson acknowledged that the syllabi were not to be considered perfect and complete. He felt that they must be augmented by sectarian instruction under the auspices of the home and the church.[31] He did not agree with some critics who believed that the Christianity of the schools was so watered down to be meaningless. Those critical of the syllabi have evaluated them as being held together by the lowest possible common denominator, vague and indistinct, minus a cutting edge and in reality an outline of ethics rather than religion. Bishop Leeson replied:[32]

> This is not so. They are full of dogma, as of course all religious teaching must be; though as is only fair and right, a line is shadowed out at the point where the Churches begin to part company. . . . Our divisions are not glossed over or ignored . . .

It would be difficult to believe that an American observer could find the syllabi in the least way watered down. If anything they appear to be overly sectarian and thus unworkable. Miss Avery wrote that in order to be acceptable the syllabi must include provisions for relating the story of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The doctrine of Christ's presence and guidance over the church militant were to be included along with other teachings of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles.[33] In many instances the syllabi follow a format. There is a consideration of sections of the Old Testament, plus the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles from the New Testament. Church history from the time of Christ is usually highlighted, as are elements of Christian doctrine and a consideration of at least two sacraments: Baptism and Holy Communion.

Prior to the Act of 1944, little mention was made of the sacraments. The 1947 West Riding syllabus has included a consideration of both Baptism and Holy Communion, stating:[34]

> Baptism is "a public sign of admission into God's Family. Every child born into a human family comes into relationship with other members of the family. Baptism brings with it a new set of relations. We are all brothers and sisters in Jesus Christ. Baptism signifies a cleansing from sin."

Concerning Communion the same syllabus cautions against any interpretation that can be construed to be purely denominational, but then it continues to speak of Holy Communion as a memorial service and a sharing by the Christian family in spiritual food which can only be given by Christ.

Instruction in and reverence for the Bible and its message is a vital part of the religious education program. The I.C.E. study lamented that a whole generation of Englishmen had grown up ignorant of the Bible. The Institute recommended that the school provide each child with his own copy of the Bible. At the conclusion of his school career the Bible was to remain with the scholar. At least one L.E.A. has such a policy.

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31 Leeson, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
32 *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
33 Margaret Avery, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
34 Leeson, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

Time allotted to religious instruction varies between authorities and school levels. In general at least one 40 minute period per week is provided by junior schools. Secondary modern schools frequently give two periods per week and grammar schools one. In every instance this is time over and above the time devoted to the Common Act of Worship.

Teachers of religion come from within the regular school family. As with any other discipline the teachers are able to receive special certification. In the early years of the program it was felt that many teachers would take advantage of the conscience clause and decline to teach religion. The fear never materialized and on the contrary there has been an increased number of teachers specializing in religion.[35]

Pupil reaction has been very favorable. In a 1952 survey of the Norwich area it was reported that 89% of the children were taking part in the program. Withdrawals generally came from children of Roman Catholic, Jewish, Seventh Day Adventist, and Christian Science families.[36] By and large Roman Catholics have not participated in the program. They prefer the Aided School program where Catholicism can be taught in a Roman Catholic atmosphere.

It should be obvious by this time that Bishop Leeson was high in his praise of the Act of 1944 as it concerned religious education. The Bishop worked diligently for the acceptance of the program. He professed that:[37]

> No one can form any idea of the meaning and purpose of education until he has first formed an idea of the meaning and purpose of human life. . . . To the Christian education without the Christian religion is not only incomplete, but the very word education itself has no meaning, is without significance, dead.

With the inauguration of the Act of 1944 Bishop Leeson was ready to concede that religious education in the tax-supported schools of Great Britain had come of age. Leeson noted that relationships had improved greatly between the Established Church and the British government. He praised the wisdom used by Parliament in enacting the program and then reminded the Church that it:[38]

> has still to live down some of the untrue and bitterly prejudiced assertions made by a few of her leaders in past days about "godless and pagan School Boards" . . .

Relation to the American problem cannot come until National agreement is reached as to our religious goals. Such agreement must follow a full appreciation of the provisions of both the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. At least one student of the American scene has spoken out in favor of the United States emulating the British solution. Dr. Henry Van Dusen in his volume *God in Education,* is convinced that once the United States defines its sense of direction in favor of recognizing God in our public institutions then American educators should look across the Atlantic and

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[35] *Religious Education in the Schools, op. cit.,* pp. 58-59.

[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 11-13.

[37] Leeson, *op. cit.,* pp. 2-7; 11.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 54.

freshen their efforts at restoring religion to its appropriate place within our school curriculum.[39]

Conclusion

Tangible similarities between the British program and religion in American public schools are few indeed. Great Britain has committed her schools to a perpetuation of Christianity as the national religion. Neither United States public schools nor the nation are so completely committed. English schools openly profess a belief in God and the teachings of Jesus Christ; American schools are at times challenged in court for recitation of the Lord's Prayer as part of daily opening exercises. Religious instruction is made mandatory in all the schools of Great Britain; released time programs in United States schools have been charged with being unconstitutional violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Money is expended in Great Britain for construction and maintenance of religious affiliated schools; United States parochial schools are challenged on any attempt to secure tax funds.

It is not the purpose of this paper to evaluate the relative merits of either program as each is carried out with due regard for the law. However, the American dilemma is far from being solved and certainly the British program offers an alternative, although extreme, solution. The religious education provisions of the Education Act of 1944 are worth scrutinization if they will aid the coming of an equitable solution to what one observer has termed the thorniest problem perennially to prick the conscience of American society: religion in public education.

The answer either for or against religion in American public education might be found within the context of the following statement authored by Professor Theodore Brameld:

> Groups of people are not free in any sense that is empirically meaningful so long as they are subjected to domination by others — so long as they are denied the opportunity to satisfy a large part of their wants or to participate, by means of political and economic authority, to a degree commensurate with their numbers in determining the policies by which these wants are to be satisfied.[40]

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LAURA TOWNE: WHITE PIONEER IN NEGRO EDUCATION, 1862-1901

by
GERALD ROBBINS

INTRODUCTION

One of the major problems confronting the Northern population when the Civil War broke out in 1861 was: What should be done with the Negro once he is under Northern direction? This question was to be partially solved by a social experiment which took place on the islands off the coast of South Carolina.

The Northern Army captured the Sea Islands lying off the coast of South Carolina in November, 1861. Besides the usual spoils of war the commanding general also took possession of some ten thousand slaves. Not knowing what to do with them, he wired Washington asking for advice. Congress immediately gave Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, jurisdiction over the operation of the plantations. Chase also assumed responsibility for the Negroes on the islands.

Chase, an ardent abolitionist, devised a plan whereby the Negro was to be given the chance of revealing his capabilities. To put this plan into effect Chase chose Edward L. Pierce, a young abolitionist lawyer from Boston, to investigate the social conditions of the Negroes on the islands. Pierce, after studying the situation of the ex-slaves, suggested to Chase that the Government send missionaries "to address the religious element of a race . . . emotional . . . in nature," and teachers to instruct the laborers and their children in reading, writing and arithmetic with the end in mind of promoting the "moral and intellectual culture of the wards."[1]

At this critical moment the Educational Commission organized in Boston and the Freedmen's Relief Association organized in New York volunteered to pay the teachers. These two societies along with other agencies, some as far as England,[2] readied themselves for their plunge into the "black belt" of the South. The government had responded to the call and the abolitionists quickly organized teachers to educate, superintendents to organize the ex-slaves into working parties, and ministers to spread the gospel. The enthusiasm as great and one minister, a Reverend Dr. Gannet, speaking to a group preparing to depart for the Sea Islands, reminded them that it was not "merely mental but moral education that we wish to bestow upon the

[1] Church and State (POAU), July, 1953, p. 1; July, 1957, p. 7. Supplement I:308.

[2] Friends of the freedmen in England maintained a school on St. Helena Island from 1862-1869. See John Watson Alvord, *Letters From the South Relating to the Conditions of the Freedmen, Addressed to Major-General O. O. Howard, Commissioner Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands* (Howard University Press, 1870), 59.

Negroes. . . . A great opportunity is offered of testing the capabilities of the African race, and let it be tried. Let us carry the Bible in one hand," he shouted, "and the spelling book in the other."[3] The second invasion of the Sea Islands was underway.

Among the first group of teachers to reach the Sea Islands was Miss Laura M. Towne of Philadelphia. At thirty-six Miss Towne was a small, stout woman with plain, stern features. One might call her a homely woman if one judged facial characteristics as the sole criteria for beauty. However, the ex-slaves thought of her as beautiful judging beauty by deeds and sacrifices. Although she never married, Miss Towne felt that her humanitarian role as teacher and physician to the Negro children and adults somehow justified her life-long station as a spinster.

Miss Towne was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, May 3, 1825. Her mother died when she was quite young and her father, John, moved his family to Boston where Laura was educated. Later the Townes moved to Philadelphia. While in Boston the family became interested in the question of abolishing Negro slavery, and their influence deepened under the provocative leadership of William Henry Furness, minister of the First Unitarian Church in Philadelphia. The stirring anti-slavery sermons of Dr. Furness[4] made Laura and her family eager converts to the cause of abolitionism. In the meantime she studied at the Women's Medical College; besides medicine Miss Towne was highly educated in the classics, philosophy, science and music.

Unlike some of her religious fanatical friends who also went to the Sea Islands, and who believed that religious training would solve all the Negroes' problems, Miss Towne thought the Negroes needed more than just the religious experience. She was interested in the physical, social, and cultural development of the ex-slaves; and as a physician was particularly concerned with the prevention and treatment of disease among the freedmen of the Sea Islands. Because of this conviction Miss Towne, along with her friend and teaching companion Ellen Murray, where in the minority concerning the means necessary to elevate the status of the ex-slaves.

Shortly after graduation from Women's Medical College, Miss Towne taught in the charity schools of the North[5] At the outbreak of the Civil War she was staying in Newport, Rhode Island. She was intensely stirred by the news of the war and set her hopes on helping the cause of the Union. Although she disliked sewing and thought "fancy work and all that an invention of the Devil . . . to distract others from their true work,"[6] for the first month or two during the war she hid her feelings and found employment in sewing

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[3] Boston *Daily Advertiser*, February 18, 1862.

[4] Furness not only preached the abolition of slavery from the humanitarian aspect but from the practical business aspect as well. "We may well wonder," he stated in a sermon, "that the brains of our businessmen do not sink down into their pockets and enable them to see what a host of eager consumers the abolition of slavery would send pouring into their market places." See William H. Furness, *The Blessings of Abolition* (Philadelphia, 1860), 13.

[5] Henry Noble Sherwood (ed.), "The Journal of Susan Walker," in *The Quarterly Publication of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio*, Vol. 7:14 (1912).

[6] Rupert S. Holland (ed.), *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne; Written From the Sea Islands of South Carolina, 1862-1884* (Cambridge, Mass., 1912), 175.

for the soldiers. Finally her golden opportunity came. The Federal Government sent out an alarm, through the newspapers, asking for teachers, superintendents, and ministers to dedicate themselves to the newly abandoned slaves of the Sea Islands. Laura, believing that this opportunity offered her a chance to do "true work," volunteered; with the purpose in mind of educating the newly abandoned slaves she departed for the Sea Islands and spent her last forty years on St. Helena Island with her friend Ellen Murray, the Negroes, and the institution she founded and came to love — Penn School.[7]

On the morning of March 3, 1862, Laura Towne stepped onto the Steamer *Oriental* bound for the Sea Islands. For traveling companions she had Edward L. Pierce, whom Chase had entrusted with the management of the Sea Island Negroes, and fifty-three other teachers and superintendents. Each had been approved by Chase and each held a certificate of appointment from the Department of the Treasury. After a hazardous trip, and as the vessel bearing the northern delegation approached the shore, Pierce exhorted his companions to undertake their tasks with courage, "for," said he, "never did a vessel bear a colony on a nobler mission, not even the *Mayflower,* when she conveyed the Pilgrims to Plymouth."[8]

Before departing from the boat, Laura and the rest of the organization were sworn in by Pierce. She repeated after him, in unison with the rest, the oath taken by all Northerners who entered the South during the war:

> I do solemnly swear that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign; that I will bear true and faithful allegiance, resolution or law of any state convention to the contrary nothwithstanding. And further, that I do this with a full determination and pledge to perform it without any mental reservations whatever; and further that I will faithfully perform all the duties which may be required of me by law. So help me God."[9]

Immediately Pierce assigned Miss Towne to the Oaks Plantation on St. Helena Island as his private secretary and housekeeper.[10] She reluctantly accepted and came to despise this position; not so much because of Mr. Pierce but because she "hated" keeping house.[11] Laura believed she could do other things which would "influence the Negroes more directly."[12]

A woman of drive and determined to make herself useful, Miss Towne took on other duties which brought her into closer contact with the Negroes. The first step towards realizing her goal of influencing the ex-slaves came when she volunteered to pass out clothing sent from the religious societies of the North. Along with the others involved in handing out clothes, she thought them to be of "miserable" quality, not fit for a "street beggar," and

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[7] *Ibid.*, xi.

[8] Edward L. Pierce, "Freedmen at the South at Fort Royal," in *Atlantic Monthly,* Vol. 12:298 (1863).

[9] Elizabeth Hyde Botume, *First Days Among the Contrabands* (Boston, 1893), 30.

[10] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 13.

[11] Noble (ed.), "Journal of Susan Walker," 34.

[12] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 15.

definitely not to be *"handled* and assorted by ladies."[13] Nevertheless she felt that some clothing, no matter what the quality, was better than no clothing at all. Because of this operation the ex-slaves came to know and respect her efforts.

Another function which at first brought Miss Towne closer to the Negroes was her function as nurse and physician. For over twenty years Miss Towne administered to the needs of the blacks. In the early years Miss Towne, and her close friend Ellen Murray, hitched up their horse "Betty" and visited any number of the fifty-six plantations on the forty-five square miles of St. Helena Island.[14] Although Laura described the roads as "horrible and the horses ditto," the trip was usually enlivened by either Laura or Ellen reading aloud; one drove while the other read, which tended to make the trip endurable.[15] As Laura went from house to house on the island her fame as a doctor spread; in a letter home she described it as "tremendous."[16]

Miss Towne found most of the Negroes to be decidedly unhealthy with bad teeth and general debility. Their bedding and sleeping apartments were, to her, unsuitable and the ex-slaves, she explained, slept on the floor at night without any clothing. They did not take proper care of themselves, she thought, after exposure to the weather and made little effort to prevent disease. Their medical knowledge was a combination of folk wisdom, "goofer doctors," superstition, and facts gleaned from ante-bellum days. They insisted on bathing a patient, for example, when the tide was going out so that it might take the fever with it. In 1864, Miss Towne complained "they keep their rooms so dark that I cannot see the patient, and if I order a window open I find it nailed up the next time I come. The people are beginning to follow a practice which I dislike. They *will* wash the patients with strong pokoroot, and vinegar and salt."[17]

Although at first Laura had a great enthusiasm for "doctoring," she later begged the benevolent societies of the North to send a young doctor to the islands. As the years caught up with her, she wanted to escape from her medical practice, possibly because the Negroes refused to cooperate, or possibly because she later suffered from rheumatism. In her *Diary,* in 1867, she confessed that her heart was not in her medical work any longer; she thought she did it "badly and very inefficiently."[18]

The difficulties Laura and the other members of the Northern abolitionist societies faced in the Sea Islands seemed insurmountable. The climate was known to be unhealthy, and smallpox, malaria, and typhoid periodically claimed a score of victims. One teacher from the North, whose strong Puritanical strain usually prevented the recording of any very strong emotions, threw discretion completely to the wind one June day and wrote that it was "damned hot" and furthermore that "if anyone should ever read this, all I have to say is that if they ever see such *tall weather,* they'll be excused from

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[13] *Obid.,* 16; see also Noble (ed.), "Journal of Susan Walker," 15.

[14] S. G. W. Benjamin, "The Sea Islands," in *Harpers New Monthly Magazine,* Vol. 57:857 (1878).

[15] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 82.

[16] *Ibid.,* 89.

[17] *Ibid.,* 122.

[18] *Ibid.,* 179.

using such an adjective."[19] Some of the teachers arrived in May, 1862, and sailed for the North the next month as it was so "fearfully hot."[20]

The condition of the ex-slaves on the Sea Islands had been hard. The cotton there was an imperious crop and had required a full year's labor to prepare for market. The plantation owners allowed the slaves no holidays except Christmas and Sundays, no rest but a few hours at night and even that shortened on Saturdays by the need of grinding at their hand-mills the weekly ration of one peck of corn.

The average plantation consisted of eighty-seven Negroes and one hundred and thirty-nine acres of cotton per annum. The plantation houses were described as being "neither old nor new."[21] The ex-slaves' dirty little cabins consisted of rough boards and had small windows without glass. The buildings were approximately 16x24 and generally without partitions.[22] The floors were of sand with an open hearth on one side; in spite of doors and shutters, large cracks let in the winter cold, and while the older people slept in bunks, the younger set slept on the floor. The cooking utensils usually consisted of a single pot most often containing hominy, or peas and salt pork. Long oyster shells served as spoons, and Miss Towne noticed that when the family "had scraped the hominy from the pot the dogs were allowed to clean it for the next meal."[23]

General William Thomas Sherman, conqueror of the islands, and commanding general of the Union forces stationed there, described the Negroes as totally uneducated, ignorant, and improvident individuals, who had always been accustomed to the lash.[24] Generally it was agreed that slavery, by providing contact between the races, tended to elevate the Africans. On the Sea Islands, however, the civilizing influence appeared to be lacking. Here the slave not only spoke a dialect completely unintelligible to one not acquainted with it,[25] but more than that was devoid of virtues which one would expect to have been acquired as the first results of contact with civilization. Edward Pierce, in some of his observations, ascribed the Negroes' position — as the "lowest" of the African races in America — to the fact of their isolation from the currents of life in the more populous districts on the mainland; an explanation which seems to have been commonly accepted.[26] Another observer compared a visit from the Sea Islands to Savannah, Georgia, with a "trip from the tenth to the fifteenth century."[27]

One of the first things Miss Towne noticed was that the Negroes' morals were low. Marriage had been unheard of; in fact, Laura admitted that most

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[20] Mary Ames, *From a New England Woman's Diary in Dixie in 1865* (Springfield, 1906), 59.

[19] Quoted in Katherine Smedley, "A Northern Teacher in the South Carolina Sea Islands," unpublished Master's thesis (University of North Carolina, 1932), 3.

[21] Sherwood (ed.), "The Journal of Susan Walker," 25.

[22] *Ibid.*, .5.

[23] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* xiv.

[24] *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (70 vols. in 128, Washington, D.C., 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. 6, 218.

[25] *The Nation,* Vol. I:774 (1865).

[26] Pierce, "The Freedmen of the South at Port Royal," 301.

[27] [Edward E. Hale and William C. Gannett], "The Freedmen at Port Royal," in *The North American Review,* Vol. 101:19 (1865).

of the Negroes living together were not married. When she asked one ex-slave how he went about obtaining his wife, he said, "I jus' tuck her and brought 'er home."[28] Laura recorded another instance concerning the Negroes, only this time as related to the church: One "Baptizing Sunday" the minister of the local Baptist Church told the people who were about to take communion that they were not to take a "long" drink of the wine, but a sip only. Miss Towne mentioned that the minister had been warned that some "meant to get their two cents' worth (the amount generally subscribed by each to buy the wine.)"[29]

The Confederate troops also posed a serious problem to the newly arrived agents, as they had only retreated a short distance inland and might at any time return in full force. Miss Towne, throughout the war, feared being captured by the Rebels as they hated the Yankee schoolmarm.[30] However, not only the Rebels posed a problem to the Northern government agents; the Yankee soldiers, who came into direct contact with the teachers, jeered at them and called them "nigger teachers,"[31] "nigger lovers," and nicknamed them "Gideonites."[32] Some of the teachers denied these accusations but Miss Towne could not understand why more did not admit that they were "anti-slavery abolitionists."[33] Laura did admit, however, that it took a lot of nerve to walk amongst the soldiers and Negroes "and not be disgusted or shocked or pained so much as to give it all up."[34]

Another element which bothered Miss Towne and the teachers were the bugs. Laura found the mosquito so "strong" that she could not write in the evening.[35] Another teacher, disgusted by the mosquitoes, but with a good sense of humor, wrote "Mosquitoes introduce themselves under the netting at night in a very mysterious way and wake us up early with their singing and stinging. My theory," she continued, "is that those that can lick the others get themselves boosted through the apertures."[36] Woodticks, fleas, rattlesnakes, and other creatures caused other female teachers to pack their bags and leave hastily for the North.[37]

Miss Towne was generally disgusted with the agents who had accompanied her on the steamer *Oriental*. Although one observer described the "Gideonites" as people of "taste and culture,"[38] Laura felt many of them to be "uneducated and coarse in their looks."[39] Some she described as unsuitable for the work on the islands, and not fitted for carrying out such purely benevolent plans as the experiment was designed to be.[40] One of her friends,

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28 *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 24.
29 *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 245.
30 *Ibid.*, 136.
31 Botume, *First Days Among the Contrabands*, 116.
32 *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 8.
33 *Ibid.*
34 *Ibid.*, 7.
35 *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 88.
36 Elizabeth Ware Pearson (ed.), *Letters From Port Royal: Written at the Time of the Civil War* (Boston, 1906), 72.
37 Ames, *From a New England Woman's Diary*, 28.
38 Sherwood (ed.), "Journal of Susan Walker," 13.
39 *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 7.
40 *Ibid.*, 26.

William F. Allen, a teacher on St. Helena Island, believed that the "curse" to the department was the "hangers on" of Missionary Societies who were sent there, he said, "because they were fitted for nothing else."[41]

Probably because of her position as Mr. Pierce's private secretary and housekeeper, Miss Towne received excellent living quarters. Few of the other teachers were as fortunate.[42] Laura compared her quarters on St. Helena Island with the country-homes in Philadelphia. Along with the other teachers she received her rent free. Although the food was sometimes full of weevils,[43] and sometimes slow in getting to them, the government supplied the teachers with monthly rations. This usually consisted of beans, brown sugar, soap, candles, coffee, fat bacon, salt pork, and a half-barrel of flour. One newly arrived teacher looked at her first monthly ration, burst into tears and wished she were dead.[44]

Although the other teachers received a salary ranging from twenty-five to one hundred dollars a month, Laura, at first, refused to accept money. It was not until 1865 that she finally had to concede as she could not afford to live on her own means any longer. It was her firm conviction that she had received credit for being a volunteer worker and thus to "sneak" for money, was, to her, "too bad,"[45] and definitely unacceptable behavior.

It was not until two years after their arrival that Laura, and her friend, Ellen Murray, decided to stay on St. Helena Island. It is doubtful whether she would have stayed without her faithful companion.[46] It was not until 1869 that together they bought the plantation Frogmore, located on the eastern shore of the island, and remained until 1901.[47] Although through the years she spent many summers at Oakshade, the family home near Philadelphia, Laura usually felt glad to return to the islands where she was needed.[48] She enjoyed her work with the Negroes, came to love them generally, and called them "our people."[49] She even forgot that their skin was black "and it is only when I see them at a distance," she wrote, "and cannot recognize their features that I remember it."[50]

To Miss Towne and her faithful companion was turned over not only the task of teaching the Negro the three R's, but also of instilling in him the rudiments of civilization. The Negro had to be torn down and rebuilt according to the white man's concept of civilization; this was the job of Miss Towne and the other schoolmarms.

The Negroes took readily to the schools established on St. Helena Island, as well as to the others established in the department. An attempt was made to place one teacher on every plantation who should conduct classes several hours a day. However, there existed a scarcity of teachers, so that on some

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[41] *Ibid.*, 37.

[42] Sherwood (ed.), "Journal of Susan Walker," 11, 13, 15.

[43] Ames, *From a New England Woman's Diary*, 32.

[44] *Ibid.*

[45] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 165.

[46] *Ibid.*, 124.

[47] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 205.

[48] *Ibid.*, x.

[49] *Ibid.*, 38.

[50] *Ibid.*, 50.

plantations the ex-slaves received only such education as they could find; this, in most cases, was negligible. Nevertheless, the schools were perhaps the best agents for obtaining the good will of the people. The books and slates which the benevolent societies supplied seemed a proof to them of the Yankee's interest in their welfare. Thus by June, 1863, there existed twelve schools in the department, attended by twenty-five hundred people, some of whom were adults and who received instruction after their work was done. By the next year there were thirty schools on the islands, conducted by forty-five teachers, with an average attendance of two thousand pupils.[51]

One thing, learned by the Negro in slavery, was that education was something which was denied to the man who was a slave. As soon as freedom came he was in a great hurry to get "white man's sense." The Negroes on the Sea Islands in the little cabin meetings held in the late evenings had sung the old spiritual: "I know I would like to read, Like to read, Like to read dat sweet story ob old, I would like to read. . . ."[52] Although the ex-slave had no definite notion in regard to education, he was pretty sure that whatever else it might be, it had nothing to do with work, especially work with the hands.

Miss Towne's burning desire to help the ex-slaves was reflected in her role as a teacher. At first, as Mr. Pierce's private secretary, housekeeper, and as the island physician, she had very little to do with instruction. Gradually, however, she began teaching Sunday School. Then Ellen asked her to substitute for a teacher a short distance from the Oaks Plantation, Government Headquarters, where they were living. Laura, comparing teaching with doctoring, said that the former was "by far the hardest work of all," especially substitute teaching.[53] A short time after arriving on the islands, however, Laura, with Mr. Pierce's permission, and Ellen, found time to teach some of the children at the Oaks Plantation. In September, 1862, because of crowded conditions, they moved their classes from the Oaks to Brick Church, the Baptist Church on St. Helena Island, and began teaching eighty "scholars."[54]

At first Miss Towne had a very difficult time keeping the children in school. She said of them:

> They had no idea of sitting still, of giving attention, of ceasing to talk aloud. They laid down and went to sleep, they scuffled and struck each other. They got up by the dozens, made their curtsies and walked off to the neighboring fields for blackberries, coming back to their seats when they were ready. They evidently did not understand me, and I could not understand them, and after two hours and a half of effort, I was thoroughly exhausted.[55]

Laura opened the school at noon and closed it at four o'clock, leaving the forenoon for the children to work in the fields. "We snatch a lunch," wrote

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[51] Edward Lillie Pierce, *Enfranchisement and Citizenship: Addresses and Papers* (Boston, 1896), 107-8.
[52] Rossa Belle Cooley, *School Acres: An Adventure in Rural Education.* (Yale University Press, 1930), 5.
[53] *Ibid.*, xiv.
[54] *Ibid.*, xiv.
[55] *Ibid.*, xv.

Miss Towne, "and begin school. I have the middle class, Ellen the oldest and youngest. At four school is out for the children. Ellen then takes the adults while I go doctoring down to the 'nigger houses.' "[56]

Laura and Ellen taught their classes at Brick Church until 1864 when crowded conditions, along with a religious controversy between the Baptists and the Unitarians, caused Laura and Ellen to leave. The Baptists did not like the idea of Unitarians occupying their building, and they accused the two Unitarians of damaging their church. The Baptist commissioner himself asked Laura and Ellen to raise one hundred and fifty dollars for repairs. Miss Towne believed that even though she raised the money the Baptist congregation would find "other excuses" to turn her and her friend out of the building.

Rather than argue with the Baptist Church, Miss Towne appealed to the Freedmen's Aid Society of Pennsylvania for assistance to maintain another school. "We are liable to expulsion," she explained.[57] Subsequently, in 1864, the agency at Philadelphia sent her a school house ready to be erected. In a moment of joy she exclaimed, "How happy we shall be nobody can tell who has not taught in a school where he or she had to make herself heard over three other classes reciting in concert, and to discover talkers and idlers among fifty scholars while one hundred and fifty more are shouting lessons and three other teachers bawling admonitions, instructions and reproofs. [58]

The new school house was slowly erected by a government carpenter with the aid of some of the islanders. Then in January, 1865, Laura, Ellen, and the students happily moved to their new location. This was the genesis of the school which Miss Towne and her associates in Pennsylvania came finally to call Penn School, after the founder of her own state.[59] Later in the same year Laura donated to the school a bell, patterned after the Liberty Bell in Pennsylvania. Its inscription, "Proclaim Liberty," served as the school motto and its ringing guided the children of the island to school in subsequent years. The school was equipped with blackboards, charts and maps; and provided the pupils with books and slates. Although the Philadelphia Branch of the Freedmen's Aid Society sponsored the building of the school, Miss Towne paid for much of the construction.[60]

After three years of work the school had reached a fair degree of organization. Classes were grouped as primary, intermediate, and higher; each in charge of one teacher in a separate room. The branches of study, however, were the same in all: reading, spelling, writing, geography, grammar, and

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[56] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* xv.

[57] *Ibid.,* 135.

[58] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 144

[59] Penn School had a continuous independent existence until 1948 when it was taken over by the South Carolina school system. Before Miss Towne died in 1901 she committed Penn School to the wisdom of Dr. Frissell, of Hampton Institute, who sent teachers to carry on where Miss Towne left off. Penn School exists today but under the heading — St. Helena Consolidated School. The State of South Carolina spent $477,400 on this building and it replaced all school buildings on St. Helena and Lady's Islands. See George B. Tindall, *South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900* (Columbia, South Carolina, 1952), 6; also, *Beaufort County, South Carolina,* February 21, 159.

[60] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 159.

arithmetic.[61] The advanced classes were reading simple stories and had mastered some passages in such common school books at Hillard's *Second Primary Reader,* Wilson's *Second Reader,* Eaton's *First Lessons in Arithmetic,* and the *Bible.* In June, 1865, Miss Towne stated that the children had read through a history of the United States, and an easy physiology.[62] Those who had enjoyed a brief period of instruction were reading short sentences or learning the alphabet. Songs were part of the curriculum; and Laura read passages from the New Testament daily.[63] Cleanliness and health habits were also taught daily.[64] Later, in 1879, Laura added sewing to the curriculum.

The eagerness for knowledge and the facility of acquisition displayed in the beginning did not abate as the years progressed.[64] One teacher, in the early 1860's, noticed that the children and adults held their books sidewise; when she asked why, a man answered, "We wish to read on all sides."[65] Miss Towne noticed, as late as 1877, that the children walked six miles to school. In driving rain, besides doing their morning chores. "Their steady eagerness to learn," she stated, "is amazing. To be deprived of a lesson, is a serious punishment. I got no reading today, or no writing or no sums, is cause for bitter tears. This race is going to rise. It is biding its time."[66] Whitelaw Reid, a correspondent for the *New York Times,* noticed that the Negro adults were so eager to learn that many of them took lessons at home from their children.[67] Edward Hale, who wrote an article for the *North American Review* concerning the education of the Freedmen, suggested that both men and children knew that power existed in letters. "No one therefore," he said, "ever said that he did not wish to read."[68] William Gannett, another contributor to the *Review,* believed that the Negro child loved the school as the white child loved a holiday."[69]

No one denied the Negroes' enthusiasm to learn. However, whether learning was actually taking place was questioned by many.[70] Miss Towne, nevertheless, was firmly convinced that her Negro pupils learned as quickly as the white children of the North. At first she compared their intelligence to the Irish, but of course explained that the Irish could speak plainer.[71]

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[61] *The Nation,* Vol. I:79 (1865).

[62] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 163.

[63] *Ibid.,* 172.

[64] Ames, *From a New England Woman's Diary,* 25.

[65] *Ibid.,* 55.

[66] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 281.

[67] Whitelaw Reid, *After the War: A Southern Tour, May 1, 1865 to May 1, 1866* (New York, 1866), 116.

[68] [Hale and Gannett], "The Freedmen at Port Royal," 533.

[69] *Ibid.,* 3.

[70] Whitelaw Reid, Edward Hale, and William Gannett all questioned whether learning was actually taking place. Hale believed that the Negro children could read well but did not understand what they read. He believed they had capacity but lacked ability. See *Ibid.,* 533. Reid believed that the Negro was only capable of memorizing and wondered what the Negro would do when "he grapples with higher branches that require original thought." See Reid, *After the War . . .,* 116. Gannett believed as Hale that the children were only memorizing and not comprehending what they read.

[71] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 5.

In her method of instruction Laura Towne showed a sense of realism not usually ascribed to "Yankee schoolmarms." Probably due to the influence of Dr. Furness, Laura Towne never used corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure.[72] Instead she employed a more positive approach through rewards and honors for student achievement. For minor derelictions, pupils were detained after school sessions and forced to write a fixed amount; for major ones they were expelled, although this extreme had been utilized only four times.[73] Miss Towne appealed to the Negroes' singing emotions by use of standard hymns, spirituals, patriotic songs, and musical rhymes composed of the A.B.C.'s, as part of the classroom instruction. One can also see Miss Towne's Republican political views in many of the exercises of the school.[74]

So popular did Laura's Penn School become that little Negro children ran away from other schools to enter Penn, as here they received "larning."[75] "Pay schools," of which Miss Towne did not approve, sprang up here and there on the islands. A Mrs. Bryand opened a pay school on St. Helena Island and charged one dollar per month for the older children and fifty cents for the young ones. Laura complained, to all who would listen, that these institutions would keep the "best and brightest from school privileges."[76]

By 1868, Laura and Ellen had started training teachers to manage small classes of students on St. Helena and the surrounding islands. In 1870, the State Department of Education in South Carolina called upon Miss Towne and her assistant for Negro teachers. In the following year the first group of teachers, seven in all, graduated with eight years of education. These teachers, for the most part, assisted established instructors for a few years and then set up their own schools. The State Department of Education paid these teachers between twenty and thirty dollars a month. Ellen complained that it was impossible for these people to subsist on such low wages, but the State Board of Education firmly believed that this was enough to pay Negro teachers.[77]

The teaching of Negroes was not confined to the classroom. Social contact with the ex-slaves was a necessity. The letter of instruction to Miss Towne from the Pennsylvania Branch of the Freedmen's Aid Society, contained the rule:

> All teachers, in addition to their regular work, are encouraged to interest themselves in the moral, religious, and social improvement of the families of these peoples; to visit their homes; to instruct the women and girls in sewing and domestic economy; to encourage and take part in religious meetings and Sunday schools.[78]

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[72] Furness, *The Blessings of Abolition*, 24.

[73] Martin Abbot, "The Freedmen's Bureau and Negro Schooling in South Carolina," in *The South Carolina Historical Magazine*, Vol. 57:77 (April, 1956).

[74] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 182, 237.

[75] *Ibid.*, 105.

[76] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne*, 179.

[77] *Reports and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina* (Charleston, 1886), 7.

[78] Luther P. Jackson, "The Educational Efforts of the Freedmen's Bureau and Freedmen's Aid Societies in South Carolina," in *The Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 8:19 (January, 1923).

Thus it was that a very large part of the activities of Miss Towne were what we call "extra-curricular."

As the years progressed, Laura took on other functions. In 1865, she was elected superintendent of the Philadelphia-sponsored schools on the islands.[79] She also took charge of the library donated by the city of Boston to the Negroes on St. Helena Island. Besides these functions, Laura took the lead in founding a temperance society, as the "whisky-shop influence" was great. She was offered other positions as well, but refused them as she liked her station as "volunteer" and was not willing to give it up.[80]

Penn School prospered under the leadership of Miss Towne. In 1879 E. S. Cheney and L. Crocker, who constituted a committee to inspect the schools supported by the New England Branch of the Freedmen's Union Commission, testified to the worthy character of the work accomplished at Penn School.[81] Later, another visitor to the islands attributed the general prosperity of St. Helena Island to Miss Towne's school.[82]

With the end of the war and the terminal of reconstruction, the support formerly given to Penn School, by the Pennsylvania Society, languished and finally ceased. Miss Towne was therefore compelled to struggle more heroically than ever to maintain the school. Only the free expenditure of her own resources, together with the efforts of Northern friends, rescued from threatened abandonment her cherished work and permitted her to witness Penn's development both as a school and a community until prior to her death in 1901.

After the war and reconstruction Miss Towne had to contend with those in the state who are opposed to the education of the Negro. Asbury Coward, prominent citizen of South Carolina, reported in 1866 that the largest and most dangerous class opposed to public education were those who opposed the education of the Negro on the grounds that "to educate a Negro is to spoil a laborer and train up a candidate for the state penitentiary."[83] Under the direction of Miss Towne, however, the Negro showed that he had the capacity to learn. The general superintendent of affairs, on St. Helena Island, was of the opinion that the capacity of the Negro to learn was greater than he had been given credit for. Also, he noticed, education had certain immediate effects on the Negro; the manners of the children and those of the adults improved tremendously.[84]

The early efforts of the Negroes for education, however, were so artificial that they immediately became the target for ridicule and scorn. The search after "little French and less Latin" became the accustomed butt of jokes. Yet there existed no college for whites in the ante-bellum South that did not worship at the feet of the same curricular gods. Higher education in the South was the "classical gentleman's education" of the scholastic tradition and the Negroes grasped out after those tools of learning which received the

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[79] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 157.

[80] *Ibid.,* 88.

[81] *The Freedmen's Record,* Vol. 5:30-1 (1869-1872).

[82] Sir George Campbell, *White and Black in the Southern States* (London, 1879), 343.

[83] *Reports and Resolutions of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina* (Charleston, 1886), 12.

[84] Pearson (ed.), *Letters From Port Royal,* 208.

highest veneration of their masters. No models existed to suggest an education for them — suited to their needs. In all America, at that time, there was no such institution and the Negroes identified wealth, leisure, and culture with Latin and Greek.[85]

Although the classical curriculum was criticized by some,[86] Laura relied on this type of education for the newly freed slaves. Fresh from the then recent victories of Horace Mann and Henry Barnard in the battle for a free public school, and spiritual descendant of Emerson, Whittier, and Thoreau, Laura nourished an intense faith in the efficacy of education in the New England tradition — as the builder of character and racial stamina. In the latter years of Penn's development Miss Towne innovated into the school's curriculum, physical and political geography; higher texts included Martindale's *United States History,* Tate's *First Book of Philosophy,* and *Natural Philosophy,* and Rolfe and Gillet's *Philosophy.* This was not all. For a time Latin, Greek, and dialectic were also offered. In brief, the entire classical curriculum was lifted bodily from New England and carried to Penn School.[87] Miss Towne brought to the Sea Island Negroes the same curriculum which she had utilized in teaching the white boy and girl in the charity schools of the North.

Laura Towne and her companion Ellen Murray helped solve one of the major problems of the ages: What should be done with the Negro once he was freed? In an attempt to answer this question and reach some definite conclusions, Miss Towne founded Penn School as a means to the end of elevating the Negro from a slave to a free individual. Though, at the time, she helped solve the initial problem, unknowingly she, along with the hundreds of other white schoolmarms, laid the foundation for the Negro separate school — which would pose a problem of vast magnitude for the Twentieth Century.

Through her efforts, on St. Helena Island, Miss Towne proved that the "lowest" of field hands could learn. A devoted humanitarian, Miss Towne firmly believed that the Negro was human and she dedicated a major portion of her life to the people on St. Helena Island. She saw, and deeply believed, as very few people did at that time, that the black race "is going to rise. It is biding its time."[88]

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[85] Horace Mann Bond, *The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order* (New York, 1934), 19-20.

[86] A traveler, visiting the state of South Carolina, answered his own question concerning the use and value of the schooling being offered the ex-slaves. He concluded that it would fit them for the "situation of a clerk, or for keeping a shop, but not at all for free labor." See Foster Burham Zincke, *Last Winter in the United States: Being Table Talk Collected During a Tour Through the Late Southern Confederation, the Far West, the Rocky Mountains &c* (London, 1868), 192-103.

[87] Hermino Munz Baumhofer, "Economic Changes in St. Helena's Parish, 1860-1870," in *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine,* Vol. 50:3 (January, 1949).

[88] *Letters and Diary of Laura M. Towne,* 287.

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KARL MANNHEIM AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

by
MARGUERITE R. HOWIE

An Introduction to His Point of View

Karl Mannheim, born in Budapest on March 27, 1893, professionally trained as a sociologist, was lecturer in Sociology at the University of Heidelberg from 1929-30 and Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department of Sociology, University of Frankfurtham Mein, 1930-33. He was pressured to leave Germany during the Hitler regime because he possessed the intellectual honesty to retain his ideas. He found refuge in England where he maintained the position of Professor of Education at the University of London from 1945 until the time of his death, June, 1947.[1]

As a member of the Athenaeum Club and as editor of the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction his ideas were influential in social frontier philosophic thought of the twentieth century. In London, he defended his epistemological position expressed in "the sociology of knowledge" in debates with his peer and colleague, Friedrich A. Hayek. Hayek challenges "planning" as the state "planners" must "arrogate to themselves the right to move in on any sector of the economic system if the good of 'society' or the 'general welfare' is paramount."[2] He fears state "dynamism" as an encroachment upon the rights of the individual. Mannheim takes the oppositional view that planning is needed to achieve the highest of values: freedom and self-determination.

Mannheim had witnessed the failure of the Weimar Republic to solve the problems of modern mass society. Through its impotency, he saw how, under certain conditions, the planlessness of the liberal order turned into anarchy. The principle of "laissez-faire," which once maintained the balance of the social process, at this stage of development turned into chaos, both in political and cultural life.[3]

Mannheim's epistemological approach to a planned society is through his sociology of knowledge. As a theory, it seeks to analyze the relationship between knowledge and existence. An historical-sociological research, it seeks to trace the forms which this relationship has taken in the intellectual development of mankind. It is concerned with "unmasking" the various ways which objects present themselves to the subject according to the differences in social setting.

His epistemological approach does not provide a blueprint for a utopia, therefore, I interpret him to be a realist possessing utopian thought. His analysis of utopian thought is in quest of reality.

The Epistemology of the Sociology of Knowledge

Louis Wirth's analysis of the problem of objectivity to the social scientist is based on the thesis that political-ethical norms not only cannot be derived

from the direct contemplation of facts, but themselves exert a moulding influence upon the modes of preceiving the fact.[5]

> The distinctive character of social science discourse is to be sought in the fact that every assertion, no matter how objective it may be, has ramifications beyond the limits of science itself. Since every assertion of a "fact" about the social world touches the interest of some individual or group, we cannot even call attention to the existence of certain "facts" without courting the objections of those whose very "raison d'être" in society rests upon a divergent interpretation of the factual situation.

The sociology of knowledge is concerned with the actual social conditions in which intelligence and thought merge. We are not only conditioned by the events that go on in the world, but we are instruments for shaping them.

The scientific approach demands objectivity in observation and analysis. Such a demand presents a problem to the social scientist because to be objective takes the "object" away from the subject. "Knowledge about" and "acquaintance with" physical objects can be known from the outside; mental and social processes can be known only from the inside except as they exhibit themselves externally through physical indexes. Mannheim analyzes what Cooley refers to as "sympathetic introspection," to view social phenomenon within the context of the meaning and values that social objects possess.[7] His analysis seeks to trace the specific connection between interest groups in society and the ideas and modes of thought which they espoused. His epistemology "unmasks" the motives that lie back of intellectual activity and analyzes the manner and extent to which the thought processes themselves are influenced by the participation of the thinker in the life of society.[8]

> What styles and modes of thought are dominating in certain types of historical situations?
>
> How do the interests and purposes of certain social groups come to find expression in certain theories, doctrines, and intellectual movements?
>
> Through what agencies or devices are ideas diffused?
>
> Who are the persons who are the bearers of intellectual activity?

His analysis leads to a sociological concept of thought, how thought functions as an instrument of collective action in public life and in politics.

The sociology of knowledge seeks to comprehend thought in the concrete setting of a historical-social situation.[9]

> Every individual is therefore in a two-fold sense predetermined by the fact of growing up in society: on the one hand he finds a ready-made situation and on the other hand he finds in that situation preformed patterns of thought and conduct.
>
> . . . As men act with and against one another in diversely organized groups, they also think with and against one another. . . . In accord with the particular context of collective activity in which they participate, men always tend to see the world which surrounds them differently.

Such a perspective makes a new type of objectivity in the social sciences attainable, not through the exclusion of evaluations but through the critical

awareness and control of them. Objectivity or the ultimate criterion of truth or falsity is to be found in the investigation of the object. This investigation examines the object as he is colored by values and the collective-unconscious. The sociological concept of thought from the collective unconscious level to the level of collective consciousness is the gamut of the subject matter of the sociology of knowledge.

A Quest For Reality Through Ideological and Utopian Analysis

Mannheim views the control of the collective unconscious to be one of the major problems of our age. Historically oriented in the religious world view, control of the collective unconscious became fractionalized in the upsurge of political outlooks that came into dominance with the split in clerical domination that accompanied the Protestant Reformation. Attempts to interpret and to analyze collectively experienced events are basic in the thinking of Adam Smith and Karl Marx.[10] Marx's theory of class struggle evidences awareness of the unconscious collective motivations which had always guided the direction of thought. It is in opposition to the party science manipulation of the collective unconscious as expressed in Marxism that Mannheim develops his thought levels from the noological stage to the level of collective consciousness. It is in this last stage that political sociology synthesizes thought into collective consciousness.

In preliterate societies where the same meanings of words, the same ways of dedicating ideas are inculcated from childhood into every member of the group divergent group processes cannot exist. Only when horizontal mobility is accompanied by intensive vertical mobility, *i.e.,* rapid movement between strata in the sense of social ascent or descent, is the belief in the general external validity of one's own thought-forms shaken.[11] According to Mannheim, vertical mobility is the decisive factor in making persons uncertain and skeptical of their traditional view of the world. It is not until we have a general democratization that the rise of the lower strata, which formerly had no public validity, enables it to acquire validity and prestige.[12] When the stage of democratization has been reached, the techniques of thinking and the ideas of the lower strata are for the first time in position to confront the ideas of the dominant strata on the same level of validity.[13] Although the lower strata, *i.e.,* the feudal peasant, possessed opinions, their validity was unrecognizable as it lacked political status.

In every society there are social groups whose special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society, *i.e.,* the "intelligentsia." In medieval society the clergy monopolized intellectual thought. It possessed the power to sanction the ontology and the epistemology implicit in the prevailing mode of thought. In such a hierarchical position it was remote from the open conflicts of everyday life, insensitive to the opinions of the masses, and removed from any obligation to reckon with the same.

The dual influences of the Protestant Reformation and the Industrial Revolution liberated the intellectuals from the church and the modern, free "intelligentsia" emerged. The free "intelligentsia" recruits from constantly varying social strata and life situations. With democratization varying social organizations or the larger world of varying strata compete for favor of the public. Monopolistic thought becomes passé.

Modern epistemology is based on the world view from the cognitive art. "Epistemology sought to eliminate uncertainty by taking its point of departure not from a dogmatically taught theory of existence, nor from a world-order which was validated by a higher type of knowledge, but from an analysis of the knowing subject."[14] Such an epistemological orientation demanded a new ontology. The meaning of good, life, sin, man, despair, salvation, or loneliness sought psychological answers based on the "inner" experiences of man. Modern psychology purports the genetic point of view — to look behind every meaning and to understand it in terms of its genesis.[15] The philosophical problem is no longer how a person may understand himself in terms of his own ideals and norms, but rather how an external situation can call forth an inner reaction, *e.g.,* although we may know a great deal about the conditions under which conflicts arise, we may still know nothing about the inner situation of living human beings, and how, when their values are shattered, they lose their bearings and strive again to find themselves.[16] This problem presented from the sociological point of view seeks to find the meaning of the genesis from the context of group life.

Investigating the cognitive process from a sociological point of view, men became aware of the collective unconscious, the motivations which guide the direction of thought based on external causations. The theory of external causality is based on the assumption that an external situation can call forth an inner reaction. Such reactions are reflected in the collective mentality of the group or the collective unconscious. Mannheim interprets these polaristic mentalities as being either ideological or utopian.[17]

I interpret his abstractions of the two types of collective unconsciousness to represent extreme mentalities and that various groups possess mentalities along a continuum deviating from these poles. Likewise, these mentalities are not static, but fluctuate along this continuum in accordance with their inner reactions to the external situation.

The ideological mentality is the collective conscious of the ruling group. Its members become so interest bound that they are unable to see the real conditions of society. The word ideology means the opinions, statements, and propositions, and systems of ideas are not taken at their face value but are interpreted in the light of the life situations of the one who interprets them.[18] The concept of ideology in historical perspective is rooted in the distrust and suspicion which men everywhere evidence toward their adversaries. (Bacon's theory of the "idols" — idols, phantoms, the preconceptions that were idols of the tribe, the market, or the theatre.[19]) During the Renaissance period, the thought of the palace was one thing; the thought of the public square was another.

The utopian mentality is representative of "thinking among certain oppressed groups."[20] These groups are so strongly interested in the transformation of a given condition of a society that they unwittingly see only those elements in the situation which tend to negate it. They are not concerned with what really exists; rather in their thinking, they already seek to change what exists.

Developing a philosophy of consciousness was synonymous with the social and political democratization. Prior to such democratization, collective mentality was at the "noological" level. Using man's conception of the world as an example, men viewed "world" as existing independently of the individual. "The word 'world' exists only with reference to the knowing mind, and the

mental activity of the subject determines the form in which the world appears."[21] Only when the total conception of ideology is seen in historical perspective does class ideology, class consciousness, develop. Ideological thinking could not develop until the feeling of nationalism was really born. The "folk" of primitive society was replaced by the "class" of medieval society; the "class" of medieval society was replaced by the "nation" of modern society. The independent system of meanings in regard to levels of society vary from one historical period to another. The types of collective conscious, the types of social and political levels are determined by the historical flux.

Historically speaking, the ideologists were a group of French intellectuals who rejected metaphysics and sought to base the cultural sciences on anthropological and psychological foundations (*e.g.,* Condillac). The concept of "false consciousness" actually originated with Marx. The problems of "false consciousness" occurs whenever the genuineness of a prophet's inspiration or vision is questioned either by his people or by himself.[22] Inadvertently, the term ideology acquired a new connotation as it was redefined by the politician in terms of his experience. As such, ideology becomes a method of research.[23] As a method of research it has the twofold function of showing the interrelationship between the intellectual point of view held and the social position occupied; of combining such a non-evaluative analysis with an epistemology. The non-evaluative conception of ideology is not concerned with which of the opposing parties has the truth on his side but to consider the approximate truth as it emerges in the course of historical development and out of the complex social process. There is no guarantee of dominant values or ideas — one position is not regarded as impregnable and absolute. The theme of this non-evaluative study of ideology is the relationship of all partial knowledge and its component elements to the larger body of meaning, and ultimately to the structure of historical reality.[24]

The transition from the non-evaluative to the evaluative conception of ideology is rooted in the understanding that every point of view is particular to a definite situation. The "unmasking" methodology of the sociology of knowledge involves finding out of what the particular situation consists. To make ontological judgments on the basis of this "unmasking" one must accept as a fact (1) the transitory character of the historical event and (2) that the changes in the relationships between events and ideas follow a certain regularity.[25] Such a method of diagnosing a historical epoch leads toward a sociological technique of diagnosing the culture of an epoch.

The sociological technique of diagnosing the culture of an epoch is based on the hypothesis that norms and values are historically and socially determined. The danger of "false consciousness" is not that it cannot grasp an absolute unchanging reality (as previously conceived in its historical orientation), but that (1) it obstructs comprehension of a reality — it prevents one from seeing which ideas are valid in a given situation (the tendency to evaluate according to outmoded norms and traditional modes); (2) it makes for incorrect interpretation of one's own self and one's own role; and (3) it may no longer be adequate for comprehending the actual world.[26] "Our definition of concepts depends upon our position and point of view which, in turn, is influenced by a good many unconscious steps in our thinking."[27] So it is with understanding the mentality of an epoch, for facts do not exist in isolation, but in an intellectual and social context. Mannheim's quest for

reality lies in the "unmasking" of ideas in their historical-social setting through ideological and utopian analysis.

His analysis accepts the collective unconscious but rejects the party science ideas of Marx. While he admits to social and political determinants of knowledge, he rejects the idea of a science of politics. Political conduct, according to Mannheim, is concerned with the state and society in so far as they are in the process of becoming. It is concerned with a process in which every moment creates a new situation. As such, it is difficult to formulate general laws in a situation where now forces are incessantly entering the system and forming unseen combinations. The observer does not stand outside of the realm of the irrational, but is a participant in the conflict of forces. Likewise, the observer's mode of thought is bound up in political and social undercurrents.

Mannheim cites general types of political currents that are the determinants of knowledge. Bureaucratic conservatism which turns all problems of politics into problems of administration; historical conservatism which cannot be managed by administration but admits to "construction by a calculated plan"; liberal-democratic bourgeoisie thought which demands scientific politics (Parliament, electoral system, League of Nations); the socialist-communist current based on the theory that the state of productive relations determines the political sphere; and the fascist theory which admits to a power élite — all are but theories. As theories, even communistic theory, they are in the process of becoming and therefore cannot become a science of politics: they cannot set up an "à priori."

In conceiving theory as a function of reality, Mannheim posits that theory leads to a certain kind of action. Inadvertently, action changes the reality, or in case of failure, forces us to a revision of the previous theory.[29] Socialist-communist theory, according to Mannheim, is a synthesis of institutionalism and a determined desire to comprehend phenomena in an extremely rational way.[30] It is based on the interdependence of economics, class and ideology: the political sphere in any society is based on and is always characterized by a state of productive relations; changes in this economic factor are closely connected with class relations; and it is possible to understand the inner structure of the system of ideas dominating men at any period and to theoretically determine the direction of change or modification of this structure.[31] Revolution, an intention to provoke a breach in the rationalized, interrupts Marxian thought and prevents Marxian ideology from perceiving the true interrelationships as they actually exist, and thus defeats the system. Marx's theory, like the others, attempts to manipulate the masses. Conservatives, liberals, and socialists operate on the theory that there is an interrelationship between events and configurations, through which everything, by virtue of its position acquires significance.[32] The Fascists use social psychology as a technique for manipulating the masses.[33] The liberal-democratic bourgeoisie carry on the class struggle through the parliamentary process. These levels of thought (antithesis), all points of view in politics, are but partial points of view because historical totality is always too comprehensive to be grasped by any one of the points of view which emerge out of it.[34]

The problem, then, is whether or not it is possible for different styles of thought to be fused into one another and to undergo synthesis? Mannheim contends that it is possible.[35]

> Every concrete analysis of thinking which proceeds sociologically and seeks to reveal the historical succession of thought-styles indicates that styles of thought undergo uninterrupted fusion and interpretation.

His re-examination of the basic thought-forms, utopia and ideology, reveals that the former has the greater possibility of synthesis. The utopian mentality is revolutionary: "a state of mind is utopian when it is incongruous with the state of reality in which it occurs."[36] It is oriented toward objects which do not exist in the actual situation, which transcend reality. The ideological mentality occupies itself more frequently with those things transcending reality than imminent in his existence. These are integrated with the world views characteristic of the period — it does not offer revolutionary possibilities.[37]

Historically, utopian mentalities have evidenced themselves in three forms: (1) those of the middle ages which originated in the depressed forms of society and advocated the "spiritualization of politics";[38] (2) liberal-humanitarianism based on idea as a goal — that "other realm which absorbed in our moral conscious inspires us as a goal — becomes bound up with the process of becoming, *i.e.,* free will, undeterminate and unconditioned; and (3) the materialistic orientated utopia based on force — that a realm of freedom and equality will come into existence in the remote future when there is a breakdown of the capitalistic culture.[39] Each of these forms is instrumental through revolution. Mannheim's thesis is dependent, not upon revolution, upon progressive development at the conscious level. Collective consciousness enables man to plan such a synthesis. The result would never be static but always in process, always in movement based on constant planning to meet the needs of the historical movement. In this movement, education would be the motivating force, the bond between all intellectuals (those whose task it is to provide an interpretation of the world for that society) no matter what the strata.[40]

Planning To Achieve the Highest of Values: Freedom and Self-determination

Mannheim considers the clash of principles of "laissez-faire" and planless regulation as the main cause of maladjustment in modern society.[41] As a consequence, modern society is faced with the problem of radical change in structure (not brief unrest). The technical and structural foundations of modern society have been completely transformed. No longer is there a choice between planning and "laissez faire" but between good planning and bad planning.[42] Based on the hypothesis that realism prevents us from prophesying a utopian future, Mannheim posits that "the new policy must be accompanied by a process of theoretical interpretation, so that a form of planning can be found which will allow for a maximum of freedom and self-determination."[43] He further contends that "if we are to direct the social forces effectively we must not remain absorbed in the continued spirit of short-run interests. The new form of policy can only succeed at a much higher level of consciousness, a consciousness with a task for experiment."[44] Thus, he considers it important to understand the difficulties of liberal democratic society and its failure in times of crises and the study of forced solutions called dictatorship.

> "The more one gets into the habit of regarding political problems as questions of power and partly of successful or unsuccessful organization, the less utopian it seems that one should not only stress the former aspects but also the latter."[45]

It becomes important, then, to use all of our intellectual energy toward finding a combination of social controls which would determine how far individual liberties should be left unrestricted in order to preserve both the freedom of the individual and the efficiency of the community.[46] His method for solving this problem is by an explanation based on a concrete sociological analysis of the sort of freedom, democracy and culture would be possible under an altered social system.

The new level of thinking, freedom at the level of planning demands that certain prerequisite needs are fulfilled. First, there is a need for psychology which would be historically and socially relevant. It would tend to link psychology with the social sciences. It would show how psychological, intellectual, and moral developments are related to the social process.

> "Thus it will only be possible to look at history from a new angle when we can study the changes of the human mind in an historical setting, in close connection with the changes in the social structure."[47]

In such a process, the forms of self-expression and ultimately the cultural conditions are thus constantly related to the different types of social groups and to the processes which take place in them.[48]

Such changes in the mental outlook and culture of our society would result in the principle of regulation replacing the principle of competition. Not only in economics, but in every sphere of life such changes are occurring. He cites the co-existence of forms and influence in art which are very different in their origins not necessarily leading to the emergence of serious tensions and crises, *i.e.,* Romanesque walls, Gothic pillars, and Baroque decorations may be side by side in unbroken peace. . . .[49] It is on this point of regulation replacing competition that Mannheim is strenuously opposed by Hayek. Hayek contrasts the new freedom with the thinking of the original apostles of political freedom.[50]

> To the great apostles of freedom the word has meant freedom from coercion, freedom from the arbitrary power of other men, release from the ties which left the individual no choice but obedience to the orders of a superior to whom he was attached. The new freedom promised, however, was to be freedom from necessity, released from the compulsion of the circumstances which inevitably limit the realm of choice for all of us, although for some very much more than for others. Before man could be truly free, the "despotism of physical want" had to be broken, the "restraints of the economic system" relaxed.

Freedom in the new sense, Hayek contends, is but another name for power or wealth, and as such has the potential of, not a Road to Freedom but, a Road to Servitude. To substantiate his challenge, he questions the possibility of freedom on an international level for, say, the usage of the Danube Basin, the creation of a kind of Tennessee Valley Authority for that area. The nations involved in such a project to equalize standards of living would rightly

feel that his interests were justifiable. How would the planners solve such claims justifiably and impartially? Claims must be ranked according to merit and some must be given precedence over others. Would not the countries whose claims receive a relegated position feel that they could reach their goal sooner if they were given freedom to act on their own devices?[51] "Although competition can bear some admixture of regulation, it cannot be combined with planning to any extent we like without ceasing to operate as an effective guide to production."[52] Hayek does not object to international planning if it merely keeps order, he thinks that it is impossible to let people live their own lives if the central authority doles out raw materials and allocates markets.

It is my interpretation that Mannheim considers the principle of regulation to lead to freedom and self-determination, while Hayek thinks that to eliminate the principle of competition leads to serfdom, the road to totalitarianism. I do think that Mannheim enforces his position through his insistence that the conscious level of thinking is not static, but consistently develops its thought-planning processes within the framework of the historical-social situation. The conscious level of thinking solicits intellectual interpretation of the socio-historic from an intelligentsia representing all levels or strata of society and not the unlimited freedom of the planner to do what he pleases as Hayek fears.[53] Although Mannheim considers that the institutional foundations of the future are rooted social security, genuine economic and educational opportunity, and the balance of a peaceful world order, he contends that no society can survive unless basic values, institutions, and education are ingrated with one another.[54] A democratic community expressing cooperative attitudes as opposed to the domineering pattern prevailing in an authoritarian society is essential to the concept of "integrating behavior" characteristic of his collective conscious. It seems to me that Mannheim is mindful of the dangers of probable totalitarian planning and Marxian utopian planning, but he is not frustrated by them. He does not take it for granted that planning can only be dictatorial; he does not take it for granted that liberty is the price to be paid for planning. He states that no society can exist without some form of power.[55] "Democracy, rightly understood, implies a theory of power aimed at defining ways of distributing and controlling communal power for maximum security, efficiency, and freedom."[56] A meaningful theory of power "observes the transmutations of power with structural changes of society; it asks what kind and amount of power goes to different members and agents of society; finally it detects and condemns abuses of power and cruelty."[57]

Aside from the danger of bad planning, there are two other dangers that are to be reckoned with in an analysis of what sort of freedom would be possible in a democratically-planned society. The first is "general disproportion in the development of human capacities" and the second is "social disproportion."[58] Mannheim's thesis accepts the first by recognizing that the good judgment and morality necessary for mastering social and economic problems is equally distributed among all groups and all classes. The social structure of complex societies "favors certain groups and condemns others to passivity since to one it assigns tasks which require certain acts of thinking and deciding, while the others can adjust themselves to their position by renouncing all insight or initiative."[59] "Social disproportion" refers to inequity in the distribution of rational and moral capacities in human society. (He would further reject a theory of a classless society as being adequate

to handle these disproportionments.) In the process of fundamental democratization the leadership potential of all groups and strata is recruited to serve the intelligentsia, the interpreters. Mannheim considers that a social disproportion between rational and moral elements to be incompatible with the process of fundamental democratization.[60]

> . . . a society in which rational habits of thought are unevenly distributed is bound to be unstable. As the democratization process becomes general it is increasingly difficult to let the masses stay in their former state of ignorance. Either one desire democracy, in which case one must attempt to bring everyone to more or less similar levels of understanding, or one must reverse the democratizing process, which indeed the dictatorial parties are, of necessity, attempting to do.

As such, we must realize that if we cannot reach the same stage of reason and morality in the control of society and of our own natures that we have reached in technology, the social order will collapse.[61] For an analytical solution of the problem, Mannheim pursues a sociological approach.

From the sociological viewpoint, substantial rationality is an act which reveals intelligent insight into the interrelation of events in a given situation. Functional rationality exists when a series of actions is organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal: every element in this series of action receives a functionally defined role: a functional organization with reference to a definite goal; a consequent calculability when viewed from the standpoint of the observer or a third person seeking to adjust itself to it. The average person surrenders part of his cultural individuality with every new act of integration into a functionally-rationalized complex of activities. He becomes increasingly accustomed to being led by others and gives up his own interpretation of events for those which others give him.[62] The problem for the sociology of knowledge then is to determine whether or not we can determine the origins of rational as well as irrational thought in modern society and bridge the hiatus between them.

Mannheim agrees that rationality is not always dangerous. It may be the most valuable power man possesses when it acts as a driving force towards rational and objective ends, or when it creates cultural values through sublimation, or when it heightens the joy of living without breaking up the social order by lack of planning.[63] When irrationalities which have not been integrated into the social order force their way into political, they become dangerous. Irrationality, then, appears in those places where rational direction is indispensable. . . . "It is the task of sociology to show at which points in a given society these irrationalities are expressed and which social functions and forms they assume."[64] Where there is unharnessed irrationality, there is danger of violence. The irrational impulses which exist in the human mind could be diverted to other spheres in order to create cultural values. The ambivalence of good and evil in man, the rational and the irrational, is a problem not only for the intelligentsia, but the man on the street also must learn to see the connection between sociological and psychological problems.[65]

In the process of historical development, man has experienced three stages of psycho-social development.[66] (1) Man at the stage of horde solidarity is relatively homogeneous and his behavior is ultimately enforced by tradition and fear. (2) Man at the stage of individual competition is capable of com-

petitive thinking, a subjective rationality (to calculate chances from one's own point of view — not necessarily the fundamental relationships between cause and effect in society as a whole. (3) Man at the stage of the super-individual group solidarity at which individuals are compelled to renounce their private interests and to subordinate themselves to the interests of the larger social units. "The individual is beginning to realize that he must plan for the whole of his society and not merely parts of it; that, further, in the course of this planning, he must show a certain concern for the fate of the whole."[67] It is here that man has arrived at a stage of planning.

Mannheim considers that modern danger lies not in the planning but lack of it.[67] His thesis is that the same tensions which are causing such distress in economic life are also at work in the cultural sphere. As a result, the planned society has the responsibility for providing an atmosphere where freedom may reach the level of self-determination. (1) Our cultural life is exposed to certain dangers, as long as democratic mass society is allowed to function without control. (2) Our cultural life encounters greater dangers when dictatorial governments supplant liberal forms. (3) . . . "These social causes which bring about cultural disintegration in a liberal society, themselves pave the way for dictatorship."[68] From Mannheim's point of view, "the task of the intellectual élites is to inspire the life of the culture and to lend it form, create a living culture in the different spheres of social life."[69] In the three stages of psycho-social development (see page 21) sociological freedom expresses itself differently. In the initial stage, freedom expresses itself in direct action on and reaction to the stimuli of the surroundings. In the second stage, man is benefited by his inventions and becomes more and more independent of natural conditions. His increased demand over his immediate aims becomes the most valued expression of his freedom. Although technique, invention, frees man from the harnesses of nature, it subjects him to the social coercion which competition entails. It is in the third stage, then, that mankind becomes increasingly entangled in the network of social relationships which he has created.[70] The self-deterministic character of the new conception of freedom creates the desire to control the social surroundings as far as possible. The advances that have been made in the social technique have reached the stage where man can conduct social affairs from key positions according to a definite plan. Human mentality has reached the third stage in the psychological transformation: from the symbol as a mere substitute goal in the first stage, to the symbol as the driving force for spontaneous group-integration in the second, and finally to the third stage where the symbol becomes the rigid symbol of the organized group.[71]

In the stage that we have just reached, we have the choice of planning in a healthy society which we ourselves have chosen. To plan a healthy society, we have need to recognize the opportunities as well as the dangers (previously discussed — see pages 16-20). Mannheim considers the major opportunities of our age to be (1) that an integrated science of man may enable us to understand clearly the causes of maladjustment and to plan a society that removes the extremes of the same; (2) that mankind has the possibility of implementing democracy by the use of efficient social techniques; (3) that we may think for and plan for humanity as a whole; (4) that once collective responsibility is realized, commonly accepted tensions may be subsided; and (5) that new weapons reduce the military significance of national boundary lines.[72]

The task of political sociology is to establish criteria for planning and to find ways of transferring democratic parliamentary control to a planned society.[73] Two lasting principles of merit which Mannheim proposes as guidelines for realization of this task are: (1) democratic agreement does not mean uniformity, but coordination of plural strivings limiting each other and producing a cooperative theme; (2) it is one of the basic tenets of political sociology that varying responses can be elicited from the very same persons according to their social fields of action, the pattern of their interrelationships, and the nature of the challenging ideas (*i.e.,* by defining constituencies according to the territorial principle, it sees to it that no sectional interest predominates at the polls).[74]

Toward Democratic Planning Values[75]

Aware that experiments may miscarry, Mannheim posits that improvement is possible only if the experimenter can clearly state what he wants; he can only try again if he knows exactly what he wanted and why he failed before. In realistic manner, he selects the following guiding values or goals toward which there may be democratic planning:

1) planning for freedom, subjected to democratic control;
2) planning for plenty — full employment and full exploitation of resources;
3) planning for social justice rather than absolute equality, with differentiation of rewards and status on the basis of genuine equality rather than privilege;
4) planning not for a classless society, but for one that abolishes the extremes of wealth and poverty;
5) planning for cultural standards without "leveling down" — a planned transition making for progress without disregarding what is valuable in tradition;
6) planning that encounters the dangers of mass society by coordination of the means of social control by interfering only in the cases of institutionalization or moral deterioration defined by collective criteria;
7) planning for balance between centralization and dispersion of power;
8) planning for gradual transformation of society in order to encourage the growth of personality: planning, but not regimentation.

As I interpret Mannheim, the "whole" plan seems significant.[76] The avoidance of fragmentation is necessary. . . . To accomplish agreement or at least "loyal opposition," a plan must fulfill certain preconditions: it must be consistent; it must be acceptable to a majority. The twofold functions of the reconstructed ruling class are: 1) to visualize and define the principles and objectives of democracy in industrial society; 2) to devise practicable ways and means to attain its ends by reforms and mass consensus.[77]

The Role of Education in the Reconstruction of the Democratic Plan

Throughout Mannheim's works a ruling élite, solicited from the intellectual potential in all classes and strata of society, is cited as the democratic power group. I understand their power to be functional, that of interpreting

the socio-historic epoch and guiding democratic planning accordingly. He expresses his democratic theory of power thusly:[78]

> Democracy, rightly understood, implies a theory of power aimed at defining ways of distributing and controlling communal power for maximum security, efficiency, and freedom.

These are but the external prerequisites for a new society. His *Diagnosis of Our Times* is founded on the premise that no society can survive unless basic values, institutions, and education are integrated with one another. It seems to me that he considers education as the instrument for accomplishing these ends. Social science replaces custom as the source for the remaking of man.[79]

Specific educational responsibilities of the social sciences as explicitly stated are:

1) "Social education . . . aims at creating a balanced personality in the spirit of real Democracy; individuality should not develop at the expense of the community sentiment."[80]
2) Social science in the place of workable tradition will assist democratic planning in three directions: it will clarify (1) the democratic idea of co-ordination; (2) the making and remaking of human behavior, *i.e.,* social and psychological means of conditioning man; (3) the pattern of democratic behavior, conscience, and personality as ends of democratic planning.[81]

Education as the groundwork for the remaking of man, the remaking of culture (as I interpret the remaking, it is from a universal concept of culture rather than from the traditional geographic perspective), according to Mannheim, must accept new tasks. An outline of his explicit responsibilities for education follows.

1) "The school may . . . perform its special tasks by intensifying and systematizing social experience — a function that the various compartments of social life can hardly perform."[82]
2) The school as an agency for change "will have to give up its older, purely scholastic character, the more it takes over the functions neglected by other social institutions. The school will have to become more homelike, more like a workshop, more like the community, as the family, workshop and community shed their educational functions. Children will have to find in school what the home has lost, perhaps because both parents work and eat out. The more fugitive the atmosphere of the two or three generation family, the more the school environment must embody and seek to impart the humanization qualities that formerly characterized good homes. . . . The task of the school is to show how to learn more efficiently from life, how to draw correct conclusions from experience, how to become one's own educator."[83]
3) The special function of the school in a democratically planned society will be to interpret all phases of life in terms of democratic experience . . . "to show the different ways of starting a family, educating the young, transacting business, spending leisure, et cetera."[84]

4) Continuity in the educational scheme: "that young people may have in the context of their own organizations experience which is in miniature that of the wider community in which they will in a fuller measure soon participate. . . . Such a policy should help to develop co-operation, tolerance, self-reliance, joint responsibility, and especially the feeling that every person counts."[85]
5) That the educational process will not become fragmentary, adult education is influential as "post-education and re-education for those who wish to keep abreast of scientific advances and swift social changes."[86]
6) The people's university to offer "permanent refresher courses for managers, technicians, ultimately for all, and especially for people in their thirties, is in keeping with our characterization of the need in a dynamic society for continuous adult education to keep everybody mentally alert and enable them to meet the modern requirements of democratic citizenship."[87]
7) Responsibility to man's quest for freedom: . . . "freedom in a planned society should not be judged in terms of the absence or presence of bureaucracy and regulation, but in terms of the common good and the best use of individual potentialities, intelligence tests, interviews, expert observation of physical and mental development and dispositions, and expert guidance of vocational choices in agreement with planned and predictable developments — and at the same time provision of unplanned sectors which give scope to people of specific gifts or aspirations — may serve man's quest for freedom in a planned world."[88]

In conclusion, it seems basic to Mannheim that the élite are not in direct contact with the masses and that it is the overall function of education to serve as a mediator or bond between all intellectuals (the social interpreters) no matter what the strata.

A Tentative Evaluative Statement of Mannheim's Utopian Thought

The new patterns of democracy proposed by Mannheim in his "Third Way" as opposed to the alternatives of "laissez-faire," Total Regimentation, Communism, or Fascism concentrates upon the monumental significance of planning the transition needs which is as decisive a factor as mapping out a distant future. His guiding principles for democratic planning can help the administrator to assess the merits of single forms and decisions in the reconstruction process. Although the intelligentsia is recruited from all strata and is representative of a fluid vertical mobility, once its status changes, its members adapt the ideas of the social-historical situation in which they find themselves. They are not in direct contact with the masses and the social structure becomes the mediating avenue. The task of the sociology of culture is (1) to describe how élites arise (in a planned society the intelligentsia becomes the élite and the educative process in the selective instrument) and (2) the role of the élites in society as a whole. The idea of reconstruction, a planning process, is dynamic, not static, in contrast to utopias designed by thinkers during the enlightenment.

The environmentalistic quality of utopian planners, say, Robert Owen, is based on the concept that by improving environment, one can change man. On the other hand, Karl Marx based his dialect on the conception that cir-

cumstances are chosen by men. However, it appears to me that his socialist ends are incompatible with his revolutionary means. . . . Although Marx is implicitly utopian, the contributions of Marx were directed toward the "unmasking" of the ideologies of the ruling class. That is, he seemed to consider his ideas to be congruous with social reality, but appeared to consider others to be of "ideological" form. Mannheim, on the other hand, considers total ideology to mean the ideology of the age or period, or of a "concrete historico-social situation."[89]

For Mannheim, then, ideas that do not exist in the social situation, ideas that transcend social realities are the content of ideologies. Therefore any reorganization in the social structure, any reconstruction are the efforts of groups that were utopian minded. It is they who have reached the level of collective consciousness needed to plan a democracy.

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cal developments which may be influenced by the growth of knowledge. He attacks the holistic quality of the sociology of knowledge because of its methodology of re-designing society as a whole. Popper considers the holistic method as impossible because in application it would resort to the expediency of piecemeal improvisation. Such expediency, Popper contends, causes the planner to do things he did not intend to do. The vastness of the scale and scope of the planner's task makes it impossible to be activistic on an "all or nothing at all" basis . . . Hayek in *The Road to Serfdom* also questions planning on the grounds that the scope is too vast for a whole or world view . . . no strata is able to view society is able to view it as a whole at any given moment.

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AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF CREATIVE TEACHING

By
JANET E. FORSLUND

The germ of this inquiry first began to stir in my mind when I attended a lecture given at Harvard University by Sir Herbert Read, English art critic and author. It was at first little more than a hazy disturbance to my pattern of thinking about society and the role of education. Read's topic was "The Role of Esthetic Play" and I was not able to define clearly in my mind just what he meant. But I found myself haunted by some of his statements. The majority of men no longer receive an emotional satisfaction from their work because their small job is so far removed from the end product that it offers no possibilities of creative experience. Contemporary Western society offers no unified tradition,[1] no central core, with which man can identify. Science and technology are providing ever-increasing leisure time for man. How can man learn to occupy this time in a way that is healthy and meaningful to him and which provides for a forward movement of society, if possible?

One question kept recurring from under the surface of my mind: How does this fit into my role as a teacher? The problem took form as I became aware of the many ways in which my teaching and our school organization and daily activities come into conflict with the individual child's search into his own unique qualifications for facing the world. Almost our every action seems to shout at him: You don't know! *We'll* tell you. You must learn what and how we say. And on every side are the many pressures which deny the child even the very time to search himself out, the subtle indoctrination which says that success lies in quite the opposite direction. The world loves not someone who dares to question its ways.

A dilemma — a merry-go-round of question without answer — in fact, of question without clear delineation. Many observations, many thoughts with no real direction. This was where I found myself until I came into contact with the writings of Hughes Mearns. Here was a man whose power as a teacher reached me in a very personal and inspiring way. The problem still exists, but perhaps it is a little more clearly defined and certain concrete suggestions appear as to the role of the classroom teacher.

How to foster creativity in the classroom?

The first requirement for defining the problem lay in deciding upon an interpretation of the meaning of creativity itself. The word is used to denote a wide variety of meanings, ranging from any action taken by an individual self to the highly-specialized, rare, formative gift of genius. Neither of these extremes represented the concept that I desired to study. Nor was I interested primarily in "the creative act," although it is surely a contributing factor.

[1] Cf. Lawrence K. Frank, "The Reorientation of Education," in *Crucial Issues in Education*, ed. by Ehlers and Lee (New York, Henry Holt, 1959).

Rather I decided upon a meaning which could perhaps be termed "creative living." Creativity is here defined to be a process of self-realization as a means of growth of the personality and spirit. It is the expression of the individual self, always moving in the direction of greater knowledge, understanding, appreciation *for that self.* To apply Dewey's thoughts, creativity can be thought to be self-expression as an integrated action, moving by its own sense of fulfillment. It is a deep involvement with the self, seen as a distinctive part of the environment — curious, imaginative, free, yet requiring an internalized discipline. It embodies keen and clarified perceptions, sensitivity to experience, honest and unprejudiced reactions, complete absorption in the experience, and willingness to work for fresh insight. It gives each person a means of organizing his own feelings and perceptions into a sense of individual wholeness. Recognizing this unique self as the only thing an individual has to give to the world, creativity is the act of discovering "I" and my relationship to the exterior world. It enables me to have faith in the significance of my own self, and still to realize and accept myself as only one small part of the large whole of life. So the subjective view seems to lead into the objective view, the self-confidence requires humility, from the individual wholeness comes a feeling of social togetherness.

It would seem that these concepts are self-evident and desirable. Of course these are a part of our American Way, a part of our system of education. But is it really so? A recent study done at the University of Chicago by Getzels and Jackson seemed to show that traits of creative giftedness were not highly desired by the child for himself, the parent for the child, or the teacher for her students.[2] On every hand the pull of success leads the child in the opposite direction from knowing his unique and creative selfhood. Mass media dull his perceptions, constant adult-planned activity robs him of the time to "feel" himself. In the classroom we seem to be more concerned with cramming into his mind than drawing out from it. Hughes Mearns states, "The folly of formal education has always been its attempt to crowd everything into the curriculum.[3] These words were written in 1929, but has the picture changed?

Erich Fromm describes the ill of modern society as alienation from self, from fellow man, from nature. Herbert Read accuses educators of having primarily intellectual aims, and formal education of being "partitive," promoting aggressiveness, competition, divisions. He suggests we need rather to promote unity, personal integrity, and virtue, to put our emphasis on values and moral judgments, rather than on knowledge alone.[4]

When the Russian Sputnik was launched, there was a great cry for more creative, inventive minds. Everyone looked to the schools, but Viktor Lowenfeld points out that the answer was sought through creating scholarships for future scientists.[5] Do we really think such a material viewpoint will give us the answer?

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[2] J. W. Getzels and P. W. Jackson, "The Study of Giftedness, a Multidimensional Approach," *Cooperative Research,* Monograph No. 2 (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 1960).

[3] Hughes Mearns, *Creative Power* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Doran, 1939), p. 264.

[4] Herbert Read, *Education For Peace* (New York, Scribner, 1949), chap. 2.

[5] Viktor Lowenfeld, "Creativity in the Wake of Sputnik," *Design,* 61:99-101 (Jan., 1960).

In our elementary schools the trend seems to be toward various kinds of team teaching, where each teacher has the opportunity to become somewhat specialized in certain subject matter areas. This has many advantages to teacher and children, but it seems to me there is a danger that we may put more and more emphasis on the material to be covered, and in the crowded scheduling, that we will not find time or opportunity to encourage attitudes of creative thinking.

New courses, such as conversational French, are being added to the curriculum. Increased pressures are being felt from parents and the upper levels of educational systems for greater knowledge, faster coverage of subject matter, thorough teaching of skills for *academic* success. And in my personal observation of teaching there seems to be a greater incidence of emotional disturbance, of children who are unable to deal with their own lives effectively. Is this observation valid? Does it have any connection with the society's values for the child, with the classroom atmosphere in which the child finds himself for so many years? Does the individual child stand a chance in today's classroom? How can I, as a teacher, strengthen his opportunity to find the unique qualities within himself and from them his place in the world?

To seek an answer to these questions I found myself joyously and refreshingly involved in the absorbing experience of living with youth through the eyes of Hughes Mearns. Mr. Mearns was involved in a five-year experiment at the Lincoln School at Columbia Teachers' College from 1920 to 1925. The purpose of the experiment was to set up an environment which might extend further the possibilities of creative learning to pupils of high-school age. It was recognized that many, possibly most, pupils are essentially creative, but that our systems of education have forced adult standards and judgments until children have learned a timidity which stands in the way of a free, adventurous spirit. Mearns speaks primarily of the field of writing and literature, but it seems to me his voice is equally important in other fields of learning.

Mearns speaks of himself as a writer first, and a teacher second, but he lives a very inspiring philosophy of education based on an indomitable faith in youth. He sees the teacher's role as one of leading the child to a discovery of himself and of providing the skills and kind of environment which allow the child a means of expression that is all his own. The words "lead" and "allow" are of key importance to Mearn's philosophy, as he believes a child cannot find his own expression when under the authoritative and tradition-ridden judgments of a teacher. He expresses a deep humility when he states, "Our aim is to discover to this generation of children the make-up of their own unconscious utterance."[6]

We as adults are so steeped in our own traditions that we cannot often know or understand what the means of this utterance will be. But we can believe that children have something fresh to say, and that we can help them find a meaningful way to say it. Often I find myself discouraged by the lack of reading done by children today, and the resultant lack of rich language background. Mearns believes firmly in a vital program of free reading, but is he perhaps saying also, "Watch out that you are not looking only for tra-

[6] Hughes Mearns, *Creative Youth* (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, Page, 1926), p. 122.

ditional language expression. Are there perhaps other fields of experience which hold greater possibilities for meaningful expression by our children today?"

I should like to apply the inspiration of Mearns to the problem of this paper in three separate parts. First, what are the child's needs if he is to be freed for creative activity, and how can the teacher work toward meeting these needs? Second, what are the teacher's needs, and what is required of her if she is to be able to allow creative activity in her classroom? And third, what implications does this have for other aspects in the field of education?

All of my reading and thinking seems to point to one need of the child as being of primary and basic importance to creative learning and creative expression. This is the need for intense individual experience, the ability to respond fully to the situation of the moment with keen perceptions, lively imagination, curiosity, spontaneity, and courage to recognize one's own emotional reactions. Dewey states that the artist is simply one who is rich in emotional experiences ready to be called up. He is capable of recalling experience and expressing it creatively because he has always been keenly aware of the richness of each experience.[7] He suggests that the teacher can help the child to develop the quality and quantity of his emotional experiences.

There are many times when we teachers are allowed a glimpse of the private emotional reactions of a child, only all too often we allow them to pass by unrecognized. Perhaps it is the deep personal loss of a much-loved pet, which the child is apt to view as weakness. Why can't we sieze on just such an opportunity to help the child become consciously aware of the depth of such an experience, the value it can have for his growing self. Perhaps here is a chance to bring him into contact with some of the fine books which express the beauty of tragedy so well, which can help him lose his feeling of aloneness and enable him to see the strength to be found only at such times. Perhaps it is a social studies discussion on slavery which is particularly packed with emotion for a child who feels the rule of authority in a devastating way. Why not help him examine the feelings of these people and some of the objective realities of the situation? Can't this help him to be more aware of himself, more alive to his own feelings? Professor Gene Phillips has spoken of the tremendous potential for developing communication of affective feelings. Freud also points out their importance to us. Our channels of affective communication are weak, except in the case of the artist. But isn't this a goal worthy of the teacher's efforts?

Mearns suggests that we must teach children to see that their everyday happenings are alive, important, interesting to others. Television has done much to dull the imagination and create a feeling of boredom for commonplace things. We seek the exciting, the new, the different. But why can't that be found in some way each day? What can be more exciting than the first snow fall, the beautiful pattern of white jet trail against a deep blue sky, the discovery that one small, dried-up maple seed hides a greenness, a stickiness, a germ of life itself? What can be lovelier than a spontaneous burst of song, a few words that say just what that child-writer intended, a splotch of water colors that suddenly appeared so different from what was expected? What can be more important than the few encouraging words of a friend, or

[7] John Dewey, *Art as Experience* (New York, Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 118.

the unspoken joy of some common discovery? Every area of subject matter and school experience can be at some time really alive and important for the child. Not always, of course, but why miss the chances that do arise? Mearns suggests that children need help in extending their experiences. We should never impose adult interpretations, but rather question the child, probe him to examine his feelings and thoughts. How does that make you feel? What came before this? Isn't there more inside you that hasn't shown in what you are expressing? But Mearns adds a word of warning to the teacher: You cannot do this for the child unless you view your own everyday life in the same way! Dare to be responsive yourself.

Herbert Read suggests that our emphasis on abstract thinking, our drive to develop highly conceptual thought, must be done by suppressing imagery. Our emphasis is on IQ, rather than creative responses.[8] Perhaps we have applied Gestalt theories in a backwards way. If knowledge is best gained by seeing experiences in a pattern, we say, then why not teach the pattern and forget about the experiences? Aren't we forgetting that there is no meaning to anyone's life except as he finds meaning and organization in his own experience? We have many suggestions from art educators who have been dealing more consciously with this problem since it relates more directly to their subject. Viktor Lowenfeld points out that we can avoid stereotyped and generalized art expression by shifting to new materials, emphasizing the experience more than the technique, the expression of feeling more than the skills, by allowing the child a self-involvement from which he can develop his own organization.[9] Can't this also be done in reading, music, science, language?

It is self-evident that intense personal experience cannot thrive in a conforming spirit. So I would place a second important need as that of nonconformity — freedom to examine, to experiment; courage to strike out alone, to sacrifice acceptance for the sake of personal convictions; ability to dream. Havoc in the classroom! Often I am the first to shout, and yet is there not some way for a teacher to become more sensitive to the child's behavior, to sense when the non-conformity is necessary to the child's development, and when it simply expresses a lack of self-discipline?

And what about the child whose need for success and acceptance overshadows his need for inquiry? Surely self-confidence and recognition are usually basic to effective action. Only recently I talked with a parent who expressed so succinctly the way in which her very talented daughter has learned to be "successful" in school, at the expense of letting her real self show, in fact, of hiding from herself. Mearns puts forth the challenge, "It is the terrible law of training that we shall have whatever we approve."[10] If this be so, then why shall we not approve the best a child has to offer, rather than a regurgitation of facts and attitudes we throw at him? Each child needs help in discovering his best. Are we all not a bit afraid of our real selves? Hold up his worth-while efforts for the child to see, even if it is only a phrase, a partial idea, an imperfect result that catches a tiny grain of the

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[8] Read, *Peace*, p. 123.

[9] Lowenfeld, *op. cit.*

[10] Mearns, *Power*, p. 78.

real self. Say to the child, "See, *you* did this, and it is fine. One thing to learn is that your good work is never, never like anybody else's good work. But it is you, and so it is valuable to the world."

But be sure it *is* good, for the child will know if you speak false praise. Help the child to take severe criticism by giving him the faith that there can be real value in what he does, if he is willing to work. Don't accept a substitute for less than his best, but try to know what his best is now. Too high a standard can only discourage. Encourage him to rework and perfect his efforts. But never forget the criterion that his best is the expression of his true self, not something imposed from without. He will need knowledge and skills; these you must help him with too, but let them be a means, not an end. However, keep in mind, that self-expression is not enough. "Is it not the business of education to improve ability, to add to strength, to secure superior results?"[11]

A teacher needs to allow children the opportunities to express opinions and judgments. But we must demand that these be based on his own experience and knowledge and that they always be open to evaluation and revision on the basis of new experiences. Can we ever do this effectively unless our students see us constantly seeking and re-evaluating? We must be willing to take a risk ourselves, to accept our own mistakes, to have faith in our own rational judgment, if we are to encourage the same from our students. Jerome Bruner believes that the teacher must be willing to guess and subject herself to critical analysis in order to foster the process of intuitive thinking and plausible guessing, factors which seem important to creative learning.[12] We must recognize that it takes courage to take the chance of being wrong.

Another requirement for creative learning is the need for self-discipline, concentration, patience. The moment must be of supreme concern. Erich Fromm suggests that any art must arise from the practice of giving oneself wholly to whatever is being done in the present, not in rebellion or indulgence, not in feverish activity, but in quiet, patient discipline and concentration. He uses the phrase "relaxed alertness," a sensing of self.[13]

John Dewey states that the spontaneity of art comes from complete absorption in the subject matter. He suggests that the teacher can encourage this by enabling the child to make observations of related materials, by providing many experiences of objective situations, by encouraging imaginative reconstruction of what is seen and heard.[14] Perhaps a child has just become aware of one example of a basic scientific principle. Instead of drawing the generalization for him by explanation, cannot the teacher help him find many other concrete examples which further examination will show to be related, and then allow the child to construct a relationship and meaning, using both knowledge and imagination? Perhaps it will not be grasped this time, but have you not paved the way for future exploration rather than cutting off all curiosity with "the answer?"

Of course, this process takes time and silence, another crying need in our

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

[12] Jerome S. Bruner, "Teaching Intuition," HGSE Bulletin, vol. V, no. 2 (Fall, 1960).

[13] Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York, Harper, 1956), chap. 4.

[14] Dewey, *op. cit.*, chap. 3.

world today. Where does a child find time today? Any changes we make in our curriculum seem to move in the direction of filling every available moment. There is so much to learn we must not "waste" a minute. Why are we so afraid of quietness, of time to think? Another harsh challenge to the teacher, requiring critical self-study. Fromm has stated the belief that our society would have a mass nervous breakdown if people were suddenly forced to spend even two weeks in complete, unspoiled solitude. Dewey speaks of the balance of "doing and undergoing" as being basic to creativity, in fact, to effective living of any kind.[15] Is it not terribly important that we try to provide children with some silence and time to themselves in their school day?

I want to mention one other pupil need. This is the need for acquaintance with people who can help the child clarify his goals, because they have traveled a little farther along the road than he has, or at least were more consciously aware of themselves as they traveled. Of course, the most obvious means of providing these experiences is through reading. Mearns makes the assumption that "close communion with the myriad varied minds of other creative souls should be stimulating to creative effort."[16] He gives us certain suggestions for providing this stimulation to our children. When reading aloud, become the thing you read. Dramatize in your thoughts and occasionally outwardly. Respect the child's taste. Never be superior and impose adult standards. Realize that his tastes will go through phases and become saturated. Allow him the time to grow. But if you would raise his tastes gradually, provide a rich supply of material and a good librarian to help him. Allow children to entice each other by suggestions. And above all, be honest in your own tastes. You must be a reader yourself, and allow yourself honest reactions, not being governed only by what is accepted as "good literature."

Vicarious experience, seen through the eyes of a sensitive writer, can add great depth to a child's own experience. The fields of history, literature, music, and art provide the child with many opportunities to see and know human functioning at its creative best and hence to better clarify his own dreams.

It has already become apparent as we have discussed the child's needs that many demands are herein made on the teacher. Some have been mentioned, and a few others need to be discussed. But I should like to propose that all of these demands, no matter how trying, can only serve to heighten the individual teacher's joy in herself, her students, and her work, because she must of necessity become a more free and creative individual herself. What greater reward can the teacher ask?

The teacher who would encourage creativity must have a solid foundation of knowledge but with it a freedom from conventional thinking to be able to seek out new combinations and to recognize new thoughts. She must train herself to spot the crude manifestations of real creativity, no matter where it may arise. Mearns suggests that those children who seem to be least successful in mastering English skills may be the very ones who have something to say, because they have not yet been cast into a mold. They may still retain an original and natural feeling for art values. "Blessed are the poor in

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[15] *Ibid.*

[16] Mearns, *Power*, p. 203.

English, for they shall see with their own eyes."[17] This sounds trite and romantic, but what teacher has not been startled at one time or another by the striking originality of an inarticulate and non-conforming child?

Another sign of creative talent to watch for is an all-absorbing and duty-defying interest on the part of a child. Why must we always cut him off, bring him back to line? Of course, the reason is apparent. This is too much of a threat to the teacher and her position of authority. Mearns states many times that the teacher must be prepared for shocks. We cannot cling to the conventional if we hope to have children go beyond it. Their interests may be crudely self-centered and often in error, but until they are allowed to test their beliefs, how can they reach a valid and maturing judgment and a faith in themselves?

So we must try to understand the process of the child's thinking and growth. We must seek to know him if we would hope to help him know himself. This takes patience, for the process of unfolding is slow. Mearns tells of a determined professor of language arts methodology who came to observe creative activity in his poetry class. She became highly impatient because she could see nothing happening. His reply to her is classic. "Here is a stop-watch. Go out and time the dandelions' growth. After an hour come tell me what has happened."[18] When my patience wears thin, I think I shall inwardly smile and say to myself, "Go out and time the dandelions."

A teacher must have a confidence in her own abilities, values, and judgments. She must trust her own individual sense of appreciation, not relying on critics or rules. But as with the child, her values need to have been formed from meaningful experience and should always be open to re-evaluation. And she needs to recognize that these values are her own, not to be imposed on the child. There is no question of superiority or inferiority; the teacher has had more time and experience from which to draw values, but the child will have his time, too. Humility and faith in the child are of utmost importance. Mearns lived the belief that each human being has a gift, some sort of gift, and life's real meaning comes from the process of seeking it, more than in what may be found at the end of the search.[19] The teacher's job is to educate, to lead forth, the child in this endeavor.

Perhaps the most important requirement for the creative teacher is that she keep alive some of her own childlike individuality, some of her unique and egoistic self. Shake off all stereotyped images and feelings. Doubt everything you have heard. Go into the world and see for yourself. Look and laugh at yourself. I find inspiration in Mearn's words, "And this is my faith, that if we put on the appearance of life and cheer and interest in things, our own hidden spirit may be enticed to come forth again."[20] Yes, a teacher must surely dare to live, if she hopes to inspire a zest for life and learning.

These thoughts give rise to some inquiries into the larger aspects of formal education, such things as school organization, physical surroundings, teacher-

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[19] *Cf.*, Ehlers and Lee, *Crucial Issues in Education*, ed.'s footnote on Professor Van Cleve Morris' existentialist viewpoint of freedom of man, pp. 88-89.

[20] Mearns, *Power*, p. 205.

training programs, and community education. I am involved in an experiment of team teaching which has proven to have many merits. But I feel concern at the increasing rigidity of time apportionment and scheduling. How can we hope to encourage creative involvement when the child is told each moment what he should be involved in and for just how long? Don't we need rather to think in terms of greater flexibility, perhaps of large blocks of learning time? Of course, this means taking a fresh look at the curriculum and the goals behind it. Are all these myriads of details we try to cover really essential? What is of greatest importance to the child in his world today?

Read suggests that the physical surroundings can have an important influence on the child's development of esthetic appreciations. Harmony, proportion, order should be considered as well as function and health.[21] I think it is important to plan space where a child can be apart from the group. Mobility of furnishings is also important to encourage intimate contacts and allow for necessary larger groupings.

Any endeavor to increase creative learning must needs involve community education. The child is a part of home and community, as well as school. Some of our proposals may be contrary to the realities he experiences. Having carefully considered our goals, I feel we have a responsibility to child and community. The child needs to know he has our support outside the school. The community has a right to the opportunity to examine our goals. And I believe the school has an obligation to try to help the society recognize its real needs. I cannot feel our only job is to preserve and pass on. If education cannot help form society's values, then it is dead![22]

Finally, we must face the problem of teacher training, for in the last analysis the kind of school will always depend on the kind of teacher in the classroom. I have recently been talking with a young lady who was discouraged to the point of changing her plans for becoming a teacher because of the lack of creative teaching and opportunity for creative learning in one of our teacher-training institutions. Why should the programs of such institutions not be a direct concern of our educational organization? Do we really have to stand by and watch the training of mediocrity?

Certainly there have been many more questions asked than answered in the course of this inquiry. There is no carefully laid out route to follow, even when we can discern where we are heading. But I feel much more strongly now that our world needs courageous and free minds and that the school can be an effective agent for encouraging them. I have found great inspiration in Hughes Mearns' faith in youth. Youth will always have new and difficult problems to face, many of which we as adults can never understand, for they live in the world of tomorrow. But we can believe in youth's ability to meet the challenge. We can provide the background and tools and send them on ahead in love and faith.

The following poems were written by high school children at the Lincoln School. They are found in Mearns' book, *Creative Youth.*

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[21] Herbert Read, *Education Through Art* (New York, Pantheon, 1945), chap. 10.

[22] *Cf.,* Ehlers and Lee, Henry Steele Commager, "Education for Americanization," pp. 83-85; I. B. Berkson, "Indoctrination and Academic Freedom," pp. 24-31.

SOPHOMORE

Leave me
For I am busy
I am tired of doing
Things in firm staid ways
Away! —
I must absorb myself in doing
Nothing.

Zora Head[23]
Grade XI

YOUTH'S EYES

Warm and happy, starlit, love filled,
And more than all,
And more than all,
Confident . . .
God —
Keep them always so!

Zara Moxham[24]
Grade X

ANCHORITE

Time is elusive;
I do not waste it
toiling to aid and serve
a thankless universe.

But, as a heedless Nero,
oblivious to all,
I play my squeaky fiddle in a
burning world.

Sanderson Vanderbilt[25]
Grade XI

Professor Gene Phillips, in a remark closing a lecture, said, "Every emotion has a means of expression. Our sole job as a teacher is to find it."

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[23] Zora Head, "Sophomore," in Mearns, *Youth*, p. 212.
[24] Zara Moxham, "Youth's Eyes," *Ibid.*, p. 176.
[25] Sanderson Vanderbilt, "Anchorite," *Ibid.*, p. 208.

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